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REYNOLDS RECONSIDERED
Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer
In the years following his resignation from the Court, Chief Justice
Warren was often asked about the case he considered to be the most
important of his tenure. The obvious answer would have been the canonical
Brown v. Board of Education,1 the racial equality case that defined the
Warren Court at the time and continues to define it more than half a
century later. Instead, as the Chief Justice wrote in his memoirs, the
“accolade should go to the case of Baker v. Carr (1962), which was the
progenitor of the ‘one man, one vote’ rule.”2 The case of the “one man, one
vote rule” to which he was referring is of course, Reynolds v. Sims.3
According to the Chief Justice, “if we had already had universal voting,
then we wouldn’t have had many of the problems Brown attempted to
correct.”4 Or put a different way, “Baker v. Carr made blacks a part of our
political system.”5 Warren was of the view that racial inequality was
directly related to political inequality. As he stated, “[m]any of our
problems would have been solved a long time ago if everyone had the right
to vote, and his vote counted the same as everybody else’s.”6 Moreover and
importantly, had the Court addressed the problem of political inequality,
the barriers to racial inequality “could have been solved through the
political process rather than through the courts.”7
Warren’s argument has great intuitive appeal and certainly finds some,
though not full, support from the political process school. According to the
political process school, substantive rights are best protected not by courts
but by the political process.8 The role of the courts is to ensure that the
channels of political change remain open.9 As long as the channels of the

1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN, THE MEMOIRS OF EARL WARREN 306 (1977) (discussing
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 98 (1962)).
3. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
4. Jack Slater, 1954 Revisited, EBONY MAGAZINE, May 1974, at 126.
5. Id.
6. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 279 (1993).
7. JACK HARRISON POLLACK, EARL WARREN: THE JUDGE WHO CHANGED AMERICA 209 (1979).
8. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980).
9. Id.
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political process remain open, voters can use those channels to obtain the
substantive change they seek.
There is no doubt that the democratic processes across the states were
clearly blocked from the late nineteenth century to the second half of the
twentieth century when the Court declared malapportionment
unconstitutional. Mass migrations to the cities, coupled with refusals to
redraw districting lines, had left state legislatures in the hands of
entrenched political minorities with no incentive to vote themselves out of
political power. By and large, legislative bodies did not reflect the
ideological or partisan distribution of their constituencies. In response,
Baker v. Carr brought the federal courts to the redistricting arena. Reynolds
v. Sims and its companion cases revolutionized the nation.
By many accounts, though the reapportionment revolution was
controversial at the time, the retrospective evaluation of the Court’s
entrance into the political thicket has been extremely positive. The one
person, one vote principle is almost universally regarded as a central
principle of political equality, and few today defend malapportionment.
More tellingly, even fewer still would advocate a return to the not-so-good
old days of yore.
Reynolds and the apportionment cases are thus rightly lauded for
bringing equality principles to bear on the design and composition of
electoral structures. And for declaring and defending the principle of
population equality, the Court has, on the whole, vindicated its decision to
enter the political thicket. The Court’s engagement with democratic politics
is especially justifiable if one focuses only on judicial supervision of
malapportionment questions.10
This aspect of Reynolds and the reapportionment cases—the obvious
correctness of population equality and its judicial defense—is widely
appreciated and now appears self-evident. Much has been said about
population equality as a core democratic principle—at least core to
democracies in the modern era—that not much more need to be said. But
there are facets of Reynolds and the reapportionment cases that have not
been rendered fully discernible and therefore cannot be fully appreciated.
Reynolds and the reapportionment cases are like a Wagnerian opera.
They contain a series of leitmotifs having to do with the role of the Court in
democratic politics, the availability of judicial standards, the problem of
political entrenchment, the sometimes challenge of partisanship, the vexing
problem of race, the nature of political rights, and the like. As importantly,
these leitmotifs are present not just in the reapportionment context but are
the recurring themes of the Court’s involvement in regulating democratic
10. Contrast Reynolds here with Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), which was controversial at
the time and remains so today, almost two decades hence.
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politics. Almost all of the difficulties and pressures that are raised by the
court-centricity of the law of democracy—indeed even the court-centricity
itself—is a function of both the Court’s decision to enter the political
thicket in such a muscular way and of the underlying political pathologies
that necessitated judicial supervision. Reynolds and the reapportionment
cases raise fundamental questions and tensions that are appendant or
appurtenant to judicial supervision of democratic politics. There is a
structural path-dependence to the law of democracy and we can trace the
steps back directly to Reynolds and the apportionment cases. Though the
law of democracy as a field and election law as an area of study have not
come to terms with these fundamental issues, they continue to haunt us
today. Our aim here is to make legible these fundamental questions and
tensions posed by Reynolds and the apportionment cases by laying them
bare. Less ambitiously, we also want to suggest, in a reductionist way, the
lessons we ought to take now slightly more than fifty years removed from
the Court’s most serious romp through democratic politics.
In this Essay we revisit Reynolds v. Sims and contextualize the
revolution that it engendered. Revisiting Reynolds enables us to see that the
same issues that confronted the Court in 1964 continue to confront us and
the Court to this day. Relatedly, the story of Reynolds and the themes of
Reynolds are also the story and themes of election law as a field. As a
framing device, we present the foundational questions and tensions
generated from Reynolds and by extension judicial supervision of
democratic politics as a series of dualities and dichotomies induced by the
Court’s involvement in regulating democratic politics. Questions about the
utility of judicial involvement in democratic politics tend to oscillate
between the two parts of a duality.
Consider as illustrative the initial question of whether courts ought to
be involved in regulating democratic politics at all (or even whether courts
ought to be involved in regulating particular sectors of democratic politics).
A fundamental question presented by Reynolds and the reapportionment
cases is whether the Constitution, which contains very little regarding the
fundamental rules of democracy, authorizes the Court to say anything
authoritative and determinative about the manner in which power is
apportioned either between and among groups or between and among
different institutional political actors. The Court’s tendency when
confronted with the difficult question of whether to supervise an area of
democratic politics is to vacillate between confessions of judicial
impotence to remedy a supposed deficiency of the democratic process and
professions of institutional confidence that it is uniquely suited to take on
the pressing democratic problem du jour. Thus, this question presents a
duality, institutional impotence versus judicial hubris or muscularity.
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Debates over judicial supervision of democracy tend to oscillate between
that duality.
Similarly, there are dualities around the question of the availability of
judicial standards, which brings up the classic rules versus standards
debate. Moreover, election law has wrestled, since Baker and Reynolds,
with the problem of political entrenchment and has vacillated between the
twin impulses of trusting and distrusting political insiders, a classic agency
problem. Additionally, as students of law and politics have recognized,
election law sometimes struggles with discerning when is race the proper
lens through which to view questions of democratic politics or whether
they are viewed through another lens such as partisanship. Other dualities
include whether political rights are individual rights or structural rights are
individual in the nature of political rights, and when should democratic
politics reflect populism impulses as against when should democratic
politics reflect republican impulses. We focus on three of these dualities in
this Essay.
Part I provides some brief context about the state of malapportionment.
Part II focuses on Baker v. Carr. Part III turns to Reynolds. Part IV
explores what Reynolds and the reapportionment cases signify for
American democracy.
I. THE POLITICAL SETTING: A LOOK AT THE STATES
In his 1960 study on reapportionment and state constitutions, Gordon
Baker wrote that “[f]ew problems of state government recur so persistently
as the apportionment of legislative representation.”11 The problem was
acute and wide-ranging. In Alabama, for example, counties with
populations ranging from 48,018 to 50,718 were given one state
representative each in the state House, while counties ranging from 13,462
to 15,286 were each awarded two state representatives.12 Similarly, in
Tennessee, counties with populations ranging between 2,340 and 25,316
had the same representation.13 This pattern repeated across the states. There
was little apparent rationality in the distribution of seats in state legislatures
and congressional delegations. The reasons were two-fold.
First, it is important to remember the historic role played by geographic
communities as units of representation.14 Dating back to colonial times and
the original thirteen colonies, legislators were selected from counties (or, in

11. GORDON E. BAKER, STATE CONSTITUTIONS: REAPPORTIONMENT, at vii (1960).
12. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 n.45 (1964).
13. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 254–55 (1962) (Clark, J., concurring).
14. See James A. Gardner, Foreword: Representation Without Party: Lessons from State
Constitutional Attempts To Control Gerrymandering, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 881, 900 (2006).
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the case of New England, from towns). This approach was supported by a
theory of representation that was inherently communal, a theory that
recognized and reflected “the force of localism, the view that every
community should have . . . a distinct and substantial[] voice in the state
legislature.”15 More importantly, this was a theory that recognized
community as borne of shared geographic closeness. According to Jim
Gardner, this theory proceeded on the premise that
people who live in close physical proximity inevitably share certain
kinds of activities, and that the bonds created through these shared
activities give rise to a community of interest that is deeply
connected to, built upon the matrix of, even induced by, the
particular locality in which the members live.16
This theory ultimately gave rise to the right to geographic representation.
The nineteenth century witnessed a switch away from county
representation and towards districts as the units of representation. State
senate representation moved away from geography as early as 1792 and
“declined rapidly” after 1800.17 This switch was in direct response to
population growth within the states. Turning to districts allowed states to
avoid serious population inequalities across represented counties while at
the same time containing the growth of their senate as a legislative body. In
other words, districting provided much needed flexibility. State house
representation also moved away from geography and towards districts, but
half a century later. This change was motivated by the lure of population
equality across relevant units. Under a districted plan, states could either
divide overpopulated counties into smaller districts or else combine
sparsely-populated counties into multicounty districts.18 Even after these
changes, however, it remained the case that “local government units should
be kept intact for purposes of representation.”19
Second, the history of malapportionment is also deeply influenced by
the Great Migration, the massive population shift that began in the
aftermath of World War I.20 Whether caused by the industrial opportunities
15. GORDON E. BAKER, THE REAPPORTIONMENT REVOLUTION: REPRESENTATION, POLITICAL
POWER, AND THE SUPREME COURT 27 (1966). Nick Stephanopoulos terms this the “theory of
communal representation.” Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Redistricting and the Territorial Community,
160 U. PA. L. REV. 1379, 1390 (2012).
16. Gardner, supra note 14, at 950.
17. Id. at 902.
18. See id. at 901–02.
19. Id. at 914.
20. See JAMES R. GROSSMAN, LAND OF HOPE: CHICAGO, BLACK SOUTHERNERS, AND THE
GREAT MIGRATION (1989); NICHOLAS LEMANN, THE PROMISED LAND: THE GREAT BLACK
MIGRATION AND HOW IT CHANGED AMERICA (1992); ISABEL WILKERSON, THE WARMTH OF OTHER
SUNS: THE EPIC STORY OF AMERICA’S GREAT MIGRATION (2010).
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created by the war or to escape from racial violence and oppression,21
blacks began to leave the South and move towards the North and the West
in record numbers.22 The numbers grew rapidly, from roughly 200,000 in
the 1900s to 500,000 in the 1910s.23 By 1960, the number would stand at
nearly five million blacks.24 This migration led to an obvious
transformation in the Black population, “from rural areas in the South to
urban areas in the North and Midwest.”25
Crucial to our larger story is the reaction that this great migration
engendered. As blacks moved from the rural South to the urban North,
whites began to exit the cities and settle in the suburbs.26 Federal housing
and highway policies played a central role in this story, favoring the
demands and interests of middle class whites while ignoring the needs of
the now-racialized cities.27 Violence and racism also played a role, of
course. But the larger point is that the federal government took sides in this
continuous flight from the cities. The story of the suburbs in the postwar
period is a story of race and exit.28 It is an old and familiar story.
It is easy to see how the move away from geographic representation
coupled with the great urban migration after the First World War turned the
Tennessee redistricting plan into a “crazy quilt.”29 The districting lines that
the Supreme Court examined in the 1960s had been drawn long before,
prior to the mass exodus from rural America to the cities. That fact alone
meant that the existing districts would no longer follow a logical pattern.
The irrationality of the plan was compounded by the use of a new metric—
population—to evaluate plans drawn on the logic of geography. This is
what the Court did in Baker v. Carr when it compared populations between

21. See Jack Temple Kirby, The Southern Exodus, 1910–1960: A Primer for Historians, 49 J. S.
HIST. 585, 589–90 (1983) (discussing some of the factors that led to the migration).
22. See DAVID A. GERBER, BLACK OHIO AND THE COLOR LINE, 1860–1915, at 470 (1976)
(discussing the city of Cleveland and various other Ohio cities); GROSSMAN, supra note 20, at 4
(discussing Chicago and Detroit); DOUG MCADAM, POLITICAL PROCESS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF
BLACK INSURGENCY, 1930–1970, at 70, 78 Table 5.2 (1982); ALLAN H. SPEAR, BLACK CHICAGO: THE
MAKING OF A NEGRO GHETTO, 1890–1920, at 40 (1967).
23. See MCADAM, supra note 22, at 78 Table 5.2.
24. Id.
25. ROBERT J. COTTROL, RAYMOND T. DIAMOND & LELAND B. WARE, BROWN V. BOARD OF
EDUCATION: CASTE, CULTURE, AND THE CONSTITUTION 205 (2003).
26. See KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED
STATES (1985); MICHAEL B. KATZ, THE UNDESERVING POOR: FROM THE WAR ON POVERTY TO THE
WAR ON WELFARE (1989); DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID:
SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1994).
27. See KATZ, supra note 26, at 134–35; MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 26, at 44–55.
28. See Nicole Stelle Garnett, Suburbs as Exit, Suburbs as Entrance, 106 MICH. L. REV. 277, 284
(2007) (“There is no question . . . that race played a major role in the great wave of postwar suburban
exit.”).
29. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 254 (1962) (Clark, J., concurring) (contending that
“Tennessee’s apportionment is a crazy quilt without rational basis”).
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counties and could not find a good reason for their gross disparities. In his
concurring opinion, for example, Justice Douglas wrote that “a single vote
in Moore County, Tennessee, is worth 19 votes in Hamilton County, that
one vote in Stewart or in Chester County is worth nearly eight times a
single vote in Shelby or Knox County.”30 Justice Frankfurter objected
precisely on this ground, to no avail.31 Population, rather than geography,
had become the sine qua non of representation.
This problem was not unique to the state of Tennessee. The same was
true in Alabama,32 Colorado,33 Maryland,34 and across the country.35 This is
how then-Senator John F. Kennedy put it, in an essay in the New York
Times Magazine published in 1958:
[T]he urban majority is, politically, a minority and the rural
minority dominates the polls. Of all the discriminations against the
urban areas, the most fundamental and the most blatant is political:
the apportionment of representatives in our Legislatures and (to a
lesser extent) in Congress has been either deliberately rigged or
shamefully ignored so as to deny the cities and their voters that full
and fair proportionate voice in government to which they are
entitled. The failure of our governments to respond to the problems
of the cities reflects this basic political discrimination. . . . Our
legislatures still represent the rural majority of half a century ago,
not the urban majority of today.36
This was the crux of the issue: the existing districting lines had been
drawn long ago and remained in place in the face of mass migrations to the
30. Id. at 245 (Douglas, J., concurring). The Court made a similar argument in Gray v. Sanders,
372 U.S. 368 (1963), where it objected to Georgia’s county unit system because it “weigh[ed] the rural
vote more heavily than the urban vote and . . . some small rural counties heavier than other larger rural
counties.” Id. at 379.
31. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 300 (“What Tennessee illustrates is an old and still widespread
method of representation—representation by local geographical division, only in part respective of
population—in preference to others, others, forsooth, more appealing.”).
32. See Sims v. Frink, 205 F. Supp. 245 (M.D. Ala. 1962).
33. See Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly of Colo., 377 U.S. 713, 729 (1964) (“Divergences
from population-based representation in the [state] Senate are growing continually wider, since the
underrepresented districts in the Denver, Pueblo, and Colorado Springs metropolitan areas are rapidly
gaining in population, while many of the overrepresented rural districts have tended to decline in
population continuously in recent years.”).
34. See Md. Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656, 664 (1964); Md. Comm. for
Fair Representation v. Tawes, 180 A.2d 656 (Md. 1962).
35. See Anthony Lewis, Legislative Apportionment and the Federal Courts, 71 HARV. L. REV.
1057, 1057 (1958) (“[I]nequalities in representation are still with us and flourishing. The districts from
which members of the forty-eight state legislatures are elected are, on the average, substantially less
representative of population today than they were a generation ago. In congressional districts, too,
disparities in population are increasing.”).
36. John F. Kennedy, The Shame of the States, N.Y. TIMES MAG., May 18, 1958, at 37.
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cities. This led to a massive underrepresentation of urban centers.
Population disparities between districts grew to unseemly and
unexplainable levels. More importantly for our story, it led to an even
larger underrepresentation of suburban political power.37 Or in the words of
J. Anthony Lukas, writing in the wake of the 1960 census, in specific
reference to the massive population growth in the suburbs around
Baltimore, “Maryland[] suburbanites have purchased split-level splendor at
the price of gradual political disfranchisement.”38
Seen this way, it is important to understand what plaintiffs were asking
courts to do in the years prior to Baker v. Carr. They were not claiming that
their votes had been denied, nor were they claiming that their preferred
candidates had lost. Rather, they were making governance claims.39 As
Pam Karlan astutely pointed out, “[t]heir real complaint is that their voice
is diluted at the post-election process of official decision making.”40 In
other words, plaintiffs were unable to exercise their governance rights as
reflected in their status as the majority in their particular states. Though a
majority, they did not have a proportional or even a fair share of their
state’s legislative power.41 They were asking the courts to give them what
the political process would not, but what their reading of democratic theory
demanded.
The Supreme Court wanted no part of this problem. As far back as
1903, the Court made clear that it would take no part in debates over
political rights, even if these rights involved larger constitutional questions.
In Giles v. Harris, for example, the Court refused to stand in the way of an
allegation that “the great mass of the white population intends to keep the
blacks from voting.”42 According to Justices Holmes, who wrote for a
majority of the Court, “[u]nless we are prepared to supervise the voting in
that state by officers of the court, it seems to us that all that the plaintiff
could get from equity would be an empty form.”43 Four decades later, the
Court similarly counseled in Colegrove v. Green that “[c]ourts ought not to
enter this political thicket. The remedy for unfairness in districting is to

37. See PAUL T. DAVID AND RALPH EISENBERG, DEVALUATION OF THE URBAN AND SUBURBAN
VOTE: A STATISTICAL INVESTIGATION OF LONG-TERM TRENDS IN STATE LEGISLATIVE REPRESENTATION
(1961).
38. J. Anthony Lukas, Barnyard Government in Maryland, 26 REP. 31, 31 (1962).
39. See Pamela S. Karlan, All Over the Map: The Supreme Court’s Voting Rights Trilogy, 1993
SUP. CT. REV. 245, 251–52.
40. Id. at 251.
41. See Pamela S. Karlan, The Rights to Vote: Some Pessimism About Formalism, 71 TEX. L.
REV. 1705, 1725 (1993).
42. Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475, 488 (1903).
43. Id.
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secure State legislatures that will apportion properly, or to invoke the
ample powers of Congress.”44
The problem for the reformers at the time was that the federal courts
offered them their only chance. The political process was essentially
foreclosed to them. The case of Tennessee is emblematic. Entrenched
politicians had no incentive to alter the district lines and governors and
state courts refused to intervene.45 Also, the state did not allow for initiative
or referenda. Prospects of reform looked bleak in the mid-1950s. A threejudge panel in Minnesota in the case of Magraw v. Donovan, however,
reinvigorated their efforts. In the face of longstanding precedent,46 the
panel concluded that it had jurisdiction “because of the federal
constitutional issue asserted.”47 The panel reviewed the evidence and also
concluded that “substantial inequality exists in the present composition of
Minnesota legislative districts.”48 But the panel fell short of granting the
relief requested, in order to give the state legislature an opportunity to act
in accordance with the state constitution. It retained jurisdiction in case the
Minnesota legislature failed to act.
Magraw v. Donovan gave the Tennessee reformers much hope. They
began litigation that would change the face of the nation. On November 23,
1959, a three-judge federal district court heard arguments on Baker v. Carr.
They denied relief to the plaintiffs a month later.49 The plaintiffs appealed.
In the interim—November 14, 1960, to be exact—the Supreme Court
decided Gomillion v. Lightfoot, the infamous Tuskegee gerrymander case.50
This case presented a serious challenge to Justice Frankfurter’s theory of
non-intervention. The facts are well known: the city of Tuskegee had a
population of 5,397 blacks and 1,310 whites; of these, only 400 blacks and
600 whites were qualified to vote.51 After the state legislature altered the
boundaries of the city “from a square to an uncouth twenty-eight-sided

44. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946).
45. Kidd v. McCanless, 292 S.W.2d 40 (Tenn. 1956), appeal dismissed, 352 U.S. 920 (1956).
46. See, e.g., Matthews v. Handley, 361 U.S. 127 (1959) (mem.), aff’g 179 F. Supp. 470 (N.D.
Ind. 1959); Hartsfield v. Sloan, 357 U.S. 916 (1958) (mem.); Radford v. Gary, 352 U.S. 991 (1957)
(mem.), aff’g 145 F. Supp. 541 (W.D. Okla. 1956); Kidd v. McCanless, 352 U.S. 920 (1956) (mem.),
dismissing appeal from 292 S.W.2d 40 (Tenn. 1956); Cox v. Peters, 342 U.S. 936 (1952) (mem.),
dismissing appeal from 67 S.E.2d 579 (Ga. 1951); Tedesco v. Bd. of Supervisors of Elections, 339 U.S.
940 (1950) (mem.), dismissing appeal from 43 So. 2d 514 (La. Ct. App. 1949); MacDougall v. Green,
335 U.S. 281 (1948) (per curiam), overruled in part by Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814 (1969);
Colegrove v. Barrett, 330 U.S. 804 (1947) (mem.); Turman v. Duckworth, 329 U.S. 675 (1946) (mem.),
aff’g 68 F. Supp. 744 (N.D. Ga. 1946); Cook v. Fortson, 329 U.S. 675 (1946) (mem.), dismissing
appeal from 68 F. Supp. 624 (N.D. Ga. 1946).
47. Magraw v. Donovan, 163 F. Supp. 184, 187 (D. Minn. 1958).
48. Id.
49. Baker v. Carr, 179 F. Supp. 824 (M.D. Tenn. 1959).
50. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
51. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 167 F. Supp. 405, 407 (M.D. Ala. 1958).
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figure”52—or what the plaintiffs termed a “sea dragon”53—only four or five
qualified black voters remained within the redrawn city limits.54 No white
qualified voters were removed.
The district court dismissed the action on the view that it had no
authority to act.55 The court of appeals affirmed.56 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari. In a post-Brown world, it seemed inconceivable that a
state could do to its black voters what Alabama had done. And yet, this was
a replay of not only Colegrove v. Green but also Giles v. Harris. The
parties’ briefs to the Court drew precisely these lines. The plaintiffs argued
that this was a deliberate violation of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments, rather than, as in Colegrove, a case about statewide
redistricting or the distribution of electoral power.57 They argued, further,
that the case did not present the “delicate issue of federal-state
relationship”58 because the state act was in clear violation of the U.S.
Constitution. There was also no avenue of relief for the plaintiffs, as in
Colegrove, nor was there a question about granting relief. If the Court
struck down the new map, the old map would then take its place. The state
responded as expected: this was a “purely political matter within the
absolute power of the State Legislature.”59 These facts were also, as in
Giles, “beyond the scope of traditional limits of proceedings in equity.”60
This was the state’s way to remind the Justices that “relief from a great
political wrong, if done, as alleged, by the people of a state and the state
itself, must be given by them or by the legislative and political department
of the government of the United States.”61
Thus, the question for the Supreme Court—and particularly for Justice
Frankfurter—was how to limit the Court to intervention in race cases, and
only race cases, while at the same time ensuring that the Court will not set
out to regulate the law of democracy writ large. Would deciding Gomillion
open the door to Baker and redistricting questions more generally? In his
concurring opinion in Gomillion, Judge Wisdom wrote that “Colegrove v.
Green and South v. Peters may be distinguishable at the periphery. At the
center these cases and the instant case are the same.”62 Solicitor General
52. Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 340.
53. Brief for Petitioners at 4, Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (No. 32), 1960 WL
98593 at *4.
54. Gomillion, 167 F. Supp. at 407.
55. Id. at 410.
56. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 270 F.2d 594 (5th Cir. 1959) rev’d, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
57. Brief for Petitioners at 6, Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (No. 32).
58. Id. at 16.
59. Brief for Respondents at 4, Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (No. 32).
60. Id. at 4 (citing Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475 (1903)).
61. Giles, 189 U.S. at 488.
62. Gomillion, 270 F.2d at 613 (Wisdom, J., concurring).
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Cox similarly told the Justices that “in principle the case of Gomillion and
Lightfoot is very similar to us. I did not see why a case should be more
justiciable because it arose under the Fifteenth Amendment rather than the
Fourteenth. And it does not seem to me that the . . . principle should be
limited to racial discrimination.”63
Justice Frankfurter disagreed. As he wrote for a unanimous Court,
Gomillion was “wholly different” from Colegrove.64 He distinguished the
cases on various grounds. First, Justice Frankfurter went to great lengths to
compartmentalize Gomillion as a Fifteenth Amendment case. In his mind,
this would remove the case “out of the so-called ‘political’ arena and into
the conventional sphere of constitutional litigation.”65 This was a crucial
distinction in the case and for the future of political questions more
generally. In a communication he wrote in response to Justice Whittaker’s
draft of a concurring opinion, which argued that the case was best
understood as a Fourteenth Amendment case, Frankfurter argued:
Displacing voters from Division A, where they enjoyed rights
through the ballot which they would not enjoy in Division B,
presents in fact a very different situation from originally making
two divisions, A and B, and thereby placing different voters in the
two divisions. If the situation is different in fact I know of nothing
that precludes it from being different in law. Displacing takes
away, deprives of, theretofore existing rights. To do so on the basis
of race is explicitly prohibited by the Fifteenth Amendment.66
Justice Whittaker responded to this argument in a subsequent draft. He was
not persuaded.67
Justice Frankfurther offered three further distinctions. First, Colegrove
arose under Article I, which gave Congress “exclusive authority” to decide

63. Oral Reargument, Part 1 at 1:39:30, Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (No. 6),
http://www.oyez.org/cases/1960-1969/1960/1960_6#reargument-1 [hereinafter Baker Oral Reargument
Part 1].
64. Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 346.
65. Id. at 346–47.
66. Frankfurter Memorandum, Gomillion v. Lightfoot, Nov. 4, 1960, William J. Brennan Papers,
Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, box I: 50, file 32.
67. See Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 349 (Whittaker, J., concurring) (contending, in response to Justice
Frankfurter’s insistence, that his view of the case “would not involve . . . the Colegrove problem”).
Tellingly, he added this mention of Colegrove in response to Justice Frankfurter’s memo from a week
before. Compare Whittaker draft opinion, Gomillion v. Lightfoot 2, Nov. 3, 1960, Brennan Papers, box
I: 50, file 32 with Whittaker draft opinion, Gomillion v. Lightfoot 2, Nov. 11, 1960, Brennan Papers,
box I: 50, file 32. Solicitor General Cox similarly told the Court during the second oral argument in
Baker, “it seems to us that in principle the case of Gomillion and Lightfoot is very similar to us. I did
not see why a case should be more justiciable because it arose under the Fifteenth Amendment rather
than the Fourteenth.” Baker Oral Reargument Part 1, supra note 63 at 1:39:30.
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the matter.68 Yet the same may not be said of the “discriminatory denial of
the municipal suffrage alleged here.”69 Second, the partisan struggles in
Colegrove “underlie so many disputes over statewide apportionment
throughout the country.”70 The facts involved a nation-wide issue. In
contrast, Gomillion “solely concerns state-imposed racial discrimination in
a specific locale.”71 Finally, the remedies in each case are different. The
plaintiffs in Gomillion were targeted due to their race, which meant that
“familiar legal remedies are available as relief.”72 In contrast, the Illinois
plaintiffs in Colegrove suffered discrimination through inaction. Also,
intervention in Colegrove may result in at-large elections, which was
contrary to congressional will. In Gomillion, however, invalidation of the
new plan would only mean that the city would revert to its old plan.73
But the distinctions were not as persuasive as Justice Frankfurter might
have wished. His assurances aside, the logic of his position, and
particularly the notion that relief for unfair redistricting must be found
within the political process, “seemed considerably less compelling.”74 A
week later, on November 21, the Court noted probable jurisdiction in Baker
v. Carr.75
II. THE COURT ENTERS THE FAMED THICKET AT LAST: BAKER V. CARR
On June 20, 1955, the Commission on Intergovernmental Relations
issued its final report to President Eisenhower on the relationship between
the states and the national government.76 The Commission, commonly
known as the Kestnbaum Commission, identified malapportionment as one
of the leading reasons for the plight of the cities and the loss of “power and
influence” by state governments.77 The Commission noted the growth of
the cities and the representative imbalance in favor of rural areas. The long
term goal was “an equitable system of representation that will strengthen
State government.”78

68. Frankfurter draft opinion, Gomillion v. Lightfoot 8, Nov. 10, 1960, Earl Warren Papers,
Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, box 471, file 32.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74.
Stephen Ansolabehere & Samuel Issacharoff, The Story of Baker v. Carr, in
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 278 (Michael Dorf ed., 2d ed. 2009).
75. Baker v. Carr, 364 U.S. 898 (1960) (mem).
76. COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
TRANSMITTAL TO THE CONGRESS (1955).
77. Id. at 38.
78. Id. at 39.
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Leading voices took to the mass media to reinforce this message.
Writing for the New York Times Magazine in 1958, then-Senator John F.
Kennedy cited the Kestnbaum Report when assailing malapportionment as
the “Shame of the States.”79 Months after Kennedy’s essay was published,
the Christian Science Monitor ran a five-part series on state legislative
malapportionment80 and a four-part series on congressional
malapportionment the following year.81 And on the eve of Kennedy’s
inauguration as president, on January 5, 1961, Edward R. Murrow hosted a
CBS hour-long special entitled “Our Election Day Illusions: The Beat
Majority.”82 The first half of the special focused on malapportionment.
Three months later, on April 19, the Supreme Court heard oral
arguments in Baker v. Carr. Charles Rhyne immediately framed his
argument for the plaintiffs as “an individual voting rights case.”83 He made
this argument in response to the then-accepted position that courts had no
power to intervene. His response was unequivocal: “there exist[s] no
judicial no-man’s-land in connection with constitutional rights of
individual[s under] the Fourteenth Amendment.”84 Judicial intervention
was particularly warranted in this case because there was no other way for
the plaintiffs to get out of this “illegal straightjacket.”85 The state legislature
would not do it; it had not done it since 1901 and “it’s almost beyond
question” that it would change its ways then.86 The state courts would not
do it because to do so “would destroy the Legislature and destroy the
government of Tennessee.”87 The governor could only ask the legislature to
act, which Tennessee governors had done repeatedly. They had been
ignored each time. Reformers could try to amend the state constitution, but
passage was also unrealistic. The process required passage of the
amendment by the state legislature, first by majority rule and then, after a
79. Kennedy, supra note 36, at 37–38.
80. See George B. Merry, Minority Rule: Challenge to Democracy, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
Oct. 2, 1958, at 13; George B. Merry, Inequities Exposed in State Voting Scales, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Oct. 6, 1958, at 15; George B. Merry, Rural-Urban Imbalance Aired in Legislatures,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 9, 1958, at 5; George B. Merry, Battles Waged to Reapportion State
Legislatures, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 13, 1958, at 7; George B. Merry, More States Face Up to
Reapportionment Responsibilities, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 16, 1958, at 3.
81. See George B. Merry, How Minorities Help Shape Congress, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June
2, 1959, at 9; George B. Merry, Rotten’ Boroughs Elect Party Chiefs, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 4,
1959, at 3; George B. Merry, Gerrymandering Lingers Across U.S., CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 13,
1959, at 10; George B. Merry, Population Shifts Hint Redistricting, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 16,
1959, at 10.
82. Our Election Day Illusions: The Beat Majority (CBS television broadcast Jan. 5, 1961).
83. Oral Argument Apr. 19, 1961 at 00:15, Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (No. 6),
http://oyez.org/cases/1960-1969/1960/1960_6#argument-1 [hereinafter Baker Oral Argument].
84. Id. at 01:05.
85. Id. at 25:45.
86. Id. at 19:29.
87. Id. at 19:47.
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six-month period, by two-thirds vote.88 Finally, there was no initiative or
referenda in Tennessee. In sum, the federal courts offered the last hope.
In response, the state took the side of the law as then understood: the
federal courts lacked jurisdiction to decide redistricting questions, which
are essentially “political or . . . legislative question[s].”89 This was
Colegrove v. Green. This was also Kidd v. McCanless,90 decided five years
before. At the time of the oral argument, on April 19, 1961, this was clearly
the best legal argument.
In his argument on behalf of the United States, Solicitor General
Archibald Cox took the side of the reformers. He argued for justiciability,
and he also argued that the case raised constitutional questions that merited
a judicial remedy. For our purposes, Solicitor General Cox’s argument is
significant for how he frames the issue that would play a central role not
only during the Baker litigation but also Reynolds. Time and again, he
argued that the right in the case was “the right to be free from arbitrary
discrimination in the exercise of the franchise which is sufficiently personal
to give the victims of the discrimination standing to sue.”91 He repeated this
point often. This was a case about the right “to be free from hostile or
capricious discrimination by a state”;92 about constitutional proscriptions
against “arbitrary and capricious distinctions affecting the right to vote.”93
He was clear that mathematical equality in the apportionment of seats to
both state houses “is not the Fourteenth Amendment requirement. Our
history makes it plain . . . .”94 All the state needed to do was have a rational
basis for its plan.95 Charles Rhyne agreed.96
Before concluding, Solicitor General Cox made three arguments that
counseled against dismissal of the litigation. First, this was not a difficult

88. TENN CONST. art. XI, § 3.
89. Oral Argument Apr. 20, 1961, at 05:15, Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (No. 6),
https://www.oyez.org/cases/1960/6#reargument-1.
90. Kidd v. McCanless, 292 S.W.2d 40, 44 (Tenn. 1956), appeal dismissed, 352 U.S. 920 (1956).
91. Baker Oral Argument, supra note 83, at 46:01.
92. Id. at 52:36.
93. Id. at 53:11; see id. at 56:34 (“Now, I say that where the apportionment that the State has
departs from the only ostensible basis on which the apportionment is based, by that degree—that this is
such an egregious error that it stands on the face of it as arbitrary and capricious.”); id. at 1:14:01 (“[I]t
should not be hard to decide whether this is or is not arbitrary and capricious . . . .”).
94. Id. at 55:10.
95. See id. at 57:10 (“Tennessee came in at the trial on the merits of this case [to] show to some
other rational foundation for what it is done . . . .”); id. at 57:55 (“The only federal right that I’m
speaking to is the right to have some rational basis for the apportionment . . . .”); id. at 59:30 (“[A]nd,
so, here, if some other rational basis is pointed out at some stage of the case . . . .”); id. at 1:00:25
(“Well, perhaps where it’s entirely irrational . . . the results don’t conform to the Fourteenth
Amendment.”); id. at 1:01:29 (“[T]he Equal Protection Clause requires a reasonable classification. And
I suppose that means when it has something rational behind it.”).
96. Id. at 12:57 (“We don’t contend that you have to have the exact mathematical equality at all,
but as near as maybe practical . . . .”).
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case. The Tennessee Constitution provides for population as “the only
ostensible basis for an apportionment . . . [a]nd the existing apportionment
clearly, egregiously departs from that standard.”97 The only question for the
courts was to decide whether the facts were “arbitrary and capricious.” On
these facts, and absent any other standard from the Tennessee Constitution,
“it should not be hard to decide” this question.98 Second, the wrong was
very serious. He reminded the Court that the existing apportionment gave
control of the state to one-third of Tennessee voters, and that some counties
have nineteen or twenty times the vote of other counties. This was the kind
of wrong that called for judicial involvement. “We’ve often been reminded,
and quite right, that the ultimate safeguard of constitutional rights is a
vigilant electorate. But where the wrong goes to the existence or
distribution of the franchise, then the electorate can do nothing to protect
itself.”99 This was a classic political process question, a case “where one
can[not] look to the working of the political process to solve the violation
of a constitutional right.”100 This was the end of the line for the reformers.
Finally, there was no other remedy available in the state. In this vein,
the Solicitor General urged caution. All he asked was for the Court to send
the case back to the lower court panel for a decision. The panel would then
go through three stages: a jurisdictional ruling; a ruling on the merits; and
whether relief, if any, is appropriate. According to the Solicitor General,
the state legislature took the position that “nobody [can] touch[ us].”101 All
it would take was for the federal court to take jurisdiction, and “that in
itself will generate great forces for a change.”102 This was key. Earlier in
the oral argument, Cox explained that all the Court needed to do was enjoin
all state officials connected with elections from carrying out any future
elections under the 1901 Act. Subsequently, the Governor would call the
legislature into a special session, where it would then “perform its
legislative function.”103 Justice Harlan, taking a page out of Colegrove and
Giles, immediately asked: “Supposing they don’t do that, then what will the
Court do?”104 This was the leading reason behind the political question
doctrine, its raison d’être.105 It is important to note where the Court was at
the time of Baker, in 1961: in the midst of the Brown revolution, seeking to

97. Id. at 1:13:45.
98. Id. at 1:14:01.
99. Id. at 1:15:00.
100. Id. at 1:16:12.
101. See id. at 1:30:17.
102. Id. at 1:30:22.
103. Id. at 39:51.
104. Id. at 41:51.
105. See Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Reconsidering the Law of Democracy: Of Political Questions,
Prudence, and the Judicial Role, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1899, 1914 (2005).
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implement the desegregation mandate. The impact of their decisions must
have weighed heavily on the Justices’ minds.
The Solicitor General responded that a further declaratory judgment on
the invalidity of the 1901 Act would be enough. After that, “we certainly
think that the Legislature would act.”106 Minutes later, he closed his portion
of the argument along similar lines: “If the federal court takes jurisdiction,
that in itself will generate great forces for a change.”107 This was
unquestionably an optimistic view. Nobody could be sure of what the state
legislature would do, in Tennessee or elsewhere. But Solicitor General Cox
was confident about what the legislature would do.
If the Court goes on to the merits and holds that there is a [sic]
constitutional apportionment, I should be amazed if the Tennessee
Legislature didn’t act. After all, the force of the principle of
legitimacy, the solemn adjudication that there is a constitutional
obligation carries a great effect with most of the people in this
country.108
At the conference the following day, on April 20, Justice Frankfurter
argued passionately against court intervention.109 Justices Clark and Harlan
took his side.110 On the other side stood Justices Douglas and Black, both
of whom dissented in Colegrove, and were joined by Justice Brennan and
the Chief Justice.111 Justice Whittaker sided with the justiciability camp but
was unwilling to join a simple majority of five Justices. This placed the
decision on Justice Stewart, who was not yet ready to take a side. Needing
more time, the Court scheduled the case for reargument the following term.
The Court so ordered a week after this first conference.112
In the interim, Justice Frankfurter drafted a sixty-page memorandum,
which he circulated to his colleagues the day after reargument. Justice
Brennan responded with his own memo, which showed the arbitrary
disparities between districts. Neither memorandum appears to have had
much influence, at least at first.
The Court heard the second argument on October 9, 1961.113 The
themes were familiar ones. Early in the session, Charles Rhyne reiterated
that the reformers were “not arguing for absolute mathematical equality
106.
107.
108.
109.
(1997).
110.
111.
112.
113.

Baker Oral Argument, supra note 83, at 42:05.
Id. at 1:30:20.
Id. at 1:30:29.
Anthony Lewis, In Memoriam: William J. Brennan, Jr., 111 HARV. L. REV. 29, 30–31
Id. at 31.
Id. at 32.
Baker v. Carr, 366 U.S. 907, 907 (1961).
Lewis, supra note 109, at 31.
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here. We’re saying we have a mathematical formula in the Tennessee
Constitution. But we are asking for the reasonable equality required by the
Fourteenth Amendment.”114 Moments later, when asked whether he found
that “the Fourteenth Amendment requires that each person’s vote in the
state be given equal weight,” his answer was simply this: “Reasonable
equality.”115 Tom Osborn argued similarly that, on these facts, “[n]o
rational basis can be discovered.”116 This was a common theme throughout.
Solicitor General Cox similarly assured the Justices that states would
retain much flexibility in the redistricting process. Judicial involvement
need not mean that the courts must control the process. In his view, states
“certainly would apportion and have great freedom to apportion according
to their own theories. As we try to suggest in our brief, the job of making
the apportionment is something which is up to the individual state
legislature.”117 To be sure, population equality would have a role to play in
the case. But as he underscored moments later, “ours is not a purely
mathematical argument. We recognized that although one should start with
equality of voting weight under our tradition that that’s not the end of the
question.”118 This was in line with what he said during the first oral
argument. This is the necessary question of standards. How would the
lower courts determine when a redistricting plan violated the Fourteenth
Amendment? The Solicitor General’s answer is illuminating, yet familiar:
“[T]he first step is simply to inquire whether there is any rational
justification or any coherent purpose for the discrimination or
differentiation of something other than sheer caprice or indifference or the
perpetuation of unjustified political power.”119 On the facts present, there
was no justification offered—a point with which counsel for the state
agreed,120 and of which Justice Brennan reminded his fellow Justices in a
subsequent memorandum to the conference.121 Absent a justification, the
judicial inquiry would end.
During the October 13 post-argument conference, the sides held firm:
Justices Frankfurter, Harlan, Clark, and Whittaker (absent a fifth vote on
the other side) on one side, Justices Black, Douglas, Brennan, and the Chief
114. Baker Oral Reargument Part 1, supra note 63, at 21:17.
115. Id. at 35:59; see also id. at 42:27 (“[T]here is no reasonable basis for the voting
discrimination which is laid out in this complaint. And the defendants offer no justification for it and
they cannot offer it on these facts.”).
116. Oral Reargument, Part 2 at 1:45:41, Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (No. 6),
http://www.oyez.org/cases/1960-1969/1960_6 [hereinafter Baker Oral Reargument Part 2].
117. Baker Oral Reargument Part 1, supra note 63, at 1:32:15.
118. Id. at 1:38:12.
119. Id. at 1:13:29.
120. Baker Oral Reargument, Part 2, supra note 116, at 1:12:04.
121. Memorandum to the Conference, Baker v. Carr 1, Oct. 12, 1961, Brennan Papers, box I: 50,
file 6.
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Justice on the other. Of note, Justice Clark argued at the conference that he
did not agree with the claim of the reformers that they had exhausted all
avenues of relief. For example, they had yet to “invoke the ample powers
of Congress.”122 The reformers had yet to make this problem a campaign
issue.123
Once Justice Stewart made up his mind and sided with Justice Brennan,
the Court stood poised to reverse Colegrove. The Chief Justice then
assigned the task of writing the opinion to Justice Brennan. On January 22,
1962, Justice Brennan sent the first printed draft of the opinion to Justice
Stewart. In a memorandum attached to the draft, Justice Brennan wrote the
following note:
You will note that I stop with the holding that the complaint states
a justiciable cause of action of a denial of equal protection of the
laws according to familiar equal protection criteria. As drafted it
defers consideration of the application of those criteria and the
matter of remedy for the determination in the first instance of the
District Court after the proofs are in.124
This assurance was enough for Justice Stewart, and the small majority held
together.
On February 2, Justice Clark wrote to Justice Brennan asking him to
delay the case while he worked on a separate opinion in addition to Justice
Frankfurter’s dissent. During the course of writing this opinion, however,
Justice Clark changed his mind. As Burke Mathes, his law clerk, explained:
In the process of writing his dissent he explored the argument that
other remedies were available. He just concluded that there weren’t
any. I think he surprised himself. He felt badly doing that to Justice
Frankfurter, whom he so often joined, at that late stage. But
afterward he felt good—felt he had done the right thing.125
This view put Justice Clark on the side of the reformers. There was no
reasonable way for the reformers in Tennessee to escape this legislative
straightjacket. If the Court declined the invitation, this was the end of the
road.

122. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946).
123. THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE (1940–1985): THE PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS BEHIND
NEARLY 300 SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 848–49 (Dell Dickson ed., 2001).
124. Memorandum to Justice Stewart, Baker v. Carr, Jan. 22, 1962, Brennan Papers, box I: 50,
file 6.
125. Telephone Interview with Burke W. Mathes, Jr., president, Cambridge Signal Technology,
Inc. (Aug. 29, 1997), quoted in Anthony Lewis, In Memoriam: William J. Brennan, Jr., 111 HARV. L.
REV. 29, 35 (1997).
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Once Justice Clark changed his mind, all the pieces quickly fell into
place. With this vote, Justice Whittaker would side with the Brennan camp
and make it 6–3, maybe 7–2 if Justice Stewart stayed on board. In the end,
Justice Whittaker did not figure into the final decision, and Justice Stewart
remained with the majority, making it a 6–2 decision.126 The Court was
coming to the political thicket at last.
We cannot overstate the significance of Baker v. Carr. The case
opened the door to legal questions that had long been kept out of the
federal courts. It brought the federal courts and the federal Constitution to
bear on questions of politics. But this was only half the question. Far more
important was the question of judicial standards. How would the Justices
approach these questions? More specifically, how would they choose to
regulate questions and issues that had long been within the purview of
political actors? How aggressive would the Justices choose to regulate
redistricting questions and, by extension, the Law of Democracy writ
large?
In line with the arguments of both Solicitor General Cox and the
plaintiffs’ lawyers, the Court appeared to take a deferential approach. As
part of the discussion of the six factors that rendered a question a “political
question,” the Court offered the following:
Nor need the appellants, in order to succeed in this action, ask the
Court to enter upon policy determinations for which judicially
manageable standards are lacking. Judicial standards under the
Equal Protection Clause are well developed and familiar, and it has
been open to courts since the enactment of the Fourteenth
Amendment to determine, if on the particular facts they must, that
a discrimination reflects no policy, but simply arbitrary and
capricious action.127
This was low-level rationality review. This was a sensible way to
approach a very sensitive topic. How to decide from among the many
relevant considerations, from equality of population to the design of a
stable two-party system or the balancing of urban and rural interests?128
The Court did not enshrine any one theory of representation over any
other,129 nor did it lay down rules for policy-makers to follow.130 Instead,

126. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
127. Id. at 226; see also id. at 254 (Clark, J., concurring) (concluding that “Tennessee’s
apportionment is a crazy quilt without rational basis”).
128. See Alexander M. Bickel, The Durability of Colegrove v. Green, 72 YALE L.J. 39, 42
(1962).
129. See Daniel R. Ortiz, Got Theory?, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 459, 467–68 (2004).
130. Bickel, supra note 128.
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the Court offered to intervene only at the margins, for those extreme cases
best understood as a “temper tantrum.”131
Notably, Justice Douglas argued that this was a new standard, as “[w]e
have usually said ‘invidious discrimination.’”132 And yet, he also assured us
that “[u]niversal equality is not the test; there is room for weighting.”133 As
the Court remanded the case to the district court to decide the case in
accordance with its opinion, it remained to be seen what the future might
bring. But nothing from the Court’s opinion indicated that “the heavens
were likely to fall as a result of the ruling that the federal courts may—and
indeed must—hear suits brought by properly qualified voters to challenge
state legislative apportionments that allegedly denied them the equal
protection of the laws.”134 One thing was clear: population equality would
play a role into the future. Litigants, and the nation, could not be sure of
how much of a role it would be.
It remained to be seen how the state legislatures would respond to the
Court’s pronouncement in Baker. This was clearly on the Justices’ minds.
At the first oral argument in Baker, Solicitor General Cox assured the
Justices that, by the end of his allotted time, the states would comply with a
constitutional ruling:
If the federal court takes jurisdiction, that in itself will generate
great forces for a change. If the Court goes on to the merits and
holds that there is an unconstitutional apportionment, I should be
amazed if the Tennessee Legislature didn’t act. After all, the force
of the principle of legitimacy, the solemn adjudication that there is
a constitutional obligation carries a great effect with most of the
people in this country.135
The topic arose again during the second oral argument. A Justice asked
the solicitor general: “And do you foresee . . . that all the 30 odd states . . .
would at once say, ‘Aye, aye’, and would at once apportion according to
your theory?”136 His response is illustrative of both how he thought the
states would respond to the ruling in the short term and what he thought the
Court should ask of the states: “[T]hey certainly would apportion, and have
great freedom to apportion, according to their own theories . . . . The job of

131. Id. at 43.
132. Memorandum to Justice Brennan, Baker v. Carr, Jan. 31, 1962, William O. Douglas Papers,
Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, box 1266, file 6.
133. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 244–45 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring).
134. Robert B. McKay, Court, Congress, and Reapportionment, 63 MICH. L. REV. 255, 257
(1964).
135. Baker Oral Argument, supra note 83, at 1:30:19.
136. Baker Oral Reargument, Part 1, supra note 63, at 1:32:02.
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making the apportionment is something which is up to the individual state
legislature.”137
The solicitor general was proven right. The reaction to the Court’s
decision was immediate and positive, “nothing short of astonishing.”138
“Instead of resistance or at best begrudging acceptance of a clearly stated
principle, as had been the case with Brown, the apportionment decision
induced an immediate, widespread, indeed eager, rush toward legislative
and judicial implementation of a principle that may have been implicit, but
was certainly not articulated.”139
The case of Tennessee is illustrative. The federal district court panel
received the mandate from the Supreme Court on April 23, 1962, four
weeks after the Court’s decision in Baker, and scheduled a pre-trial
conference for May 7.140 At the conference, the attorney general of
Tennessee informed the court that the Governor of Tennessee intended to
call a special session of the general assembly to consider the state’s
response to the ruling.141 Three weeks later, the general assembly convened
in special session and enacted two separate reapportionment acts, each for
the house and senate seats. The Governor approved both acts on June 7,
1962.
The response from the states was nothing short of remarkable. Note
that Tennessee legislature managed to do in the three-and-a-half months
after the Baker decision what it had refused to do in the prior sixty-one
years. Other states reacted similarly. By the first week of September,
plaintiffs had brought lawsuits in at least twenty-two states.142 And by the
end of 1962, a scant nine months after Baker, litigation had begun in thirtyfive states.143 Redistricting, according to the New York Times, was “burning
like a prairie fire across the nation.”144
Robert McCloskey tried to make sense of this reaction. The best he
could surmise was “the conjecture that the Court here happened to hit upon
what the students of public opinion might call a latent consensus.”145 The
Court, in other words, got lucky. It caught a wave of public opinion at the

137. Id. at 1:32:15.
138. Robert G. McCloskey, Foreword: The Reapportionment Case, 76 HARV. L. REV. 54, 56
(1962).
139. Robert B. McKay, Political Thickets and Crazy Quilts: Reapportionment and Equal
Protection, 61 MICH. L. REV. 645, 645–46 (1963).
140. Baker v. Carr, 206 F. Supp. 341, 343 (M.D. Tenn. 1962).
141. Id.
142. See Layhmond Robinson, 22 States Battle on Redistricting: Fight Spurred by High Court
Ruling is Spreading Fast, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1962, at 23.
143. McKay, supra note 139, at 646, 706–10 (containing an appendix that summarizes the
litigation through 1962).
144. Robinson, supra note 142, at 23.
145. McCloskey, supra note 138, at 59.
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proper time and rode it. But this only began the inquiry for the long-term
regulation of the political thicket. It still remained an open question
whether the Justices would follow the path of mathematical equality, as
Douglas and Black had argued for many years, or whether they would
follow the path of rationality, as the Solicitor General counseled and the
Baker opinion assured us. This was not an easy question. What did political
equality mean?
The lower courts were clearly struggling with the tension between
these two approaches. Rationality review demanded deference to the
implied institutional competence of political actors. According to Anthony
Lewis, for example, plaintiffs must first make a showing that the existing
population inequality exceeded “reasonable legislative discretion.”146 Upon
this showing, the burden would shift to the states to show that they had a
“rational, nondiscriminatory basis”147 for the challenged plan. In contrast,
population equality demanded a far more assertive approach from the
courts, as well as the elevation of one principle of representation over all
others. The two approaches could co-exist, to be sure, but not easily.
Population equality mattered, as reflected by the many charts and figures
used by the plaintiffs in the Baker litigation, and which were included by
Justice Brennan in the appendix to his opinion.148 But population equality
was only the starting point. States could deviate from population so long as
they did so reasonably and rationally. Justice Douglas made precisely this
point in his concurring opinion, when he remarked that “[u]niversal
equality is not the test; there is room for weighting.”149 It remained to be
seen how committed the Warren Court would remain to this view.
Courts wrestled with this tension in the aftermath of Baker. Most
challenged plans were measured against the population standard, and courts
struck down a majority of them. But the one lesson of this period is that
courts were all over the map. Some courts upheld plans that deviated from
strict population equality while other courts struck down plans with smaller
population variances. Of the first fifteen cases decided in the wake of
Baker, eleven struck down the existing redistricting plans while four upheld
them.150 And yet, “[t]he tremendous variance in statistics and legal
reasoning running through these fifteen cases, however, makes
identification of a coherent doctrine or numerical standard next to
impossible.”151 This meant, according to Alexander Bickel, that “[t]he

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Lewis, supra note 35, at 1086.
Id.
See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 237–41 (1962) (appendix to opinion of the Court).
Id. at 244–45 (Douglas, J., concurring).
Arthur L. Goldberg, The Statistics of Malapportionment, 72 YALE L.J. 90, 97 (1962).
Id.
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rationality test led nowhere; and within the year the Supreme Court had
abandoned it.”152
This was a crucial moment in the reapportionment revolution. The
rationality test had been trumpeted by the reformers, from Anthony Lewis
and Charles Rhyne to Solicitor General Cox, as the obvious solution to the
question of standards. During the oral arguments, in fact, they had assured
the Justices time and again that mathematical equality was not required.
But as he looked to the future, Justice Brennan well understood that
rationality was not the answer.
Proceeding incrementally would result in a painful and confused
process, and one that might ultimately fail. Addressing the
apportionment problem required a single absolute standard. The
Court’s standard had to ensure equality and had to be easily and
unambiguously applied. Equally important, it must be rooted in
constitutional principles and fundamental rights.153
Once the courts abandoned the rationality test, there was one obvious
replacement. “There was, Brennan understood even in the spring of 1962,
just one such standard: equality.”154
The Justices were soon flooded with cases and they needed to settle on
how to approach them. They could not decide them piecemeal, because
how they decided some questions might foreclose others. So the Justices,
and particularly Chief Justice Warren and Justice Brennan, decided to wait
until they could settle on a constitutional test. The Court had two cases on
its docket at the time it decided Baker—a challenge to Michigan’s
redistricting plan155 and a challenge to New York’s apportionment of its
state senate156—and it vacated the judgments for consideration in light of
Baker. The courts had dismissed both claims for lack of jurisdiction, which
meant that this remand was simply an order to hold hearings on the merits.
The cases would come back to the Court the following year. This
disposition would buy the Justices much needed time.
There was one exception to this strategy: Georgia’s primary election
law and the county-unit rule. The law, known as the Neill Primary Act,
dated back to 1917 and governed state-wide primary races, such as
governor, lieutenant governor, and U.S. Senator. Under the law, unit votes

152.

Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court and Reapportionment, in REAPPORTIONMENT IN
at 57, 64 (Nelson W. Polsby ed., 1971).
153. STEPHEN ANSOLABEHERE & JAMES M. SNYDER JR., THE END OF INEQUALITY: ONE
PERSON, ONE VOTE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN POLITICS 165 (2008).
154. Id.
155. Scholle v. Hare, 369 U.S. 429 (1962).
156. WMCA, Inc. v. Simon, 370 U.S. 190 (1962).
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were assigned to the various counties according to population.157 The eight
most populous counties received six unit votes each; the next thirty
counties received four unit votes; and the rest of the counties received two
units a piece. In turn, the candidate who won the county’s popular vote
received all the unit votes from that county, and the candidate who received
the most unit votes won the nomination. What follows is quite familiar.
When the law was first enacted, the state of Georgia had 159 counties, of
which 121 were rural counties with less than 30% of the population. These
rural counties controlled 242 unit votes, or around 60% of the total unit
votes. In contrast, by 1960 the eight most populous counties had 40% of the
state’s population yet less than 12% of the unit votes. The disparities
between counties made little sense. Fulton County, with 556,326 residents,
received six unit votes, or 1.46% of the total of 410 unit votes; whereas the
smallest county in Georgia, Echols County, with 1,876 residents, received
two unit votes, or 0.48% of the total.158 This was a classic “crazy quilt.”
Even after the state amended the law on the same day that the District
Court heard the case, the resulting disparities were irrational as measured
by population totals.
On appeal, the Supreme Court concluded that “[o]nce the geographical
unit for which a representative is to be chosen is designated, all who
participate in the election are to have an equal vote—whatever their race,
whatever their sex, whatever their occupation, whatever their income, and
wherever their home may be in that geographical unit.”159 Most
importantly, the Court offered for the first time its definition of political
equality as required by the Constitution: “The conception of political
equality from the Declaration of Independence, to Lincoln’s Gettysburg
Address, to the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amendments can
mean only one thing—one person, one vote.”160 This was significant. To be
sure, and as Justice Stewart underscored in his concurring opinion, this case
involved the selection of a representative for a statewide constituency.161
This was not Baker v. Carr, which involved the drawing of district lines—
and thus the forming of geographic constituencies—from which
representatives would be chosen. But as Robert Dixon told Archibald Cox
years later, the case “nevertheless coined the easily transferable ‘one man–

157. Neill Primary Act §§ 34-3212–34-3218, GA. CODE ANN. (Supp. 1917), repealed by 34 GA.
CODE ANN. § 2001 (1970).
158. See Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 371–73 (1963).
159. Id. at 379.
160. Id. at 381.
161. Id. at 382.
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one vote’ phrase, and conditioned all that followed.”162 Once the Court took
this step, the road to mathematical equality became much easier.
The Court decided Gray v. Sanders on March 18, 1963.163 This was a
significant time in the South, and the state of Alabama in particular, as the
setting for Reynolds v. Sims. The Birmingham campaign was just
beginning, a nonviolent movement designed to bring attention to the city of
Birmingham by the Southern Christian Leadership Conference. This was a
crucial moment in civil rights history. On April 12, Dr. King was arrested
by Birmingham police for demonstrating without a permit, and four days
letter he penned his canonical “Letter from Birmingham Jail.” On
September 15, white supremacists set off a bomb at the Sixteenth Street
Baptist Church. Four young girls were killed. The summer of ’63 was
significant in other ways. President Kennedy delivered a speech on civil
rights as he defended his decision to send the National Guard to the
University of Alabama; James Meredith graduated from Ole Miss; and in
August, Dr. King delivered his transcendental “I Have a Dream” speech in
Washington, D.C.
The civil rights movement was pressing the country to finally confront
and remedy the effects of its racial past. Not coincidentally, the mantra of
the movement, as coined by Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee
President John Lewis, was “one man, one vote.” As he told the crowd
during his speech at the March on Washington in August 1963, “‘One Man,
One Vote’ is the African cry. It is ours, too. It must be ours.”164 At the same
time, lawyers in Birmingham and across the country were asking the
Supreme Court to force rural elites, under the guise of equal protection, to
give up power to urbanites and, ultimately, suburbanites. Both avenues of
reform complemented each other, and either one alone would not be
enough. The movement sought to register eligible citizens, but their
subsequent votes would prove meaningless if legislatures were not forced
to reconfigure the severely malapportioned district lines. The Court and the
movement would have to work together.
By the summer of ’63, the Court had five cases on its docket: the
Georgia congressional representation case and four redistricting cases from
Alabama, Maryland, New York, and Virginia. The Court was ready to
tackle the issue head-on. It had to answer three questions. First, what
standard would guide courts and legislatures into the future? Would the
Justices impose a rigid mathematical requirement, or would they follow a
more flexible approach, as Baker promised and the Solicitor General

162. J. DOUGLAS SMITH, ON DEMOCRACY’S DOORSTEP: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW THE
SUPREME COURT BROUGHT “ONE PERSON, ONE VOTE” TO THE UNITED STATES 115 (2014).
163. 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
164. SMITH, supra note 162, at 100.
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exhorted? Second, what role would the federal analogy play in the future?
Would the Justices allow one house in a bicameral legislature to deviate
from the metric of population? And third, would it make any constitutional
difference whether the resulting malapportionment was a result of
legislative inaction?
The Court noted probable jurisdiction in Reynolds v. Sims and its
companion cases on June 10, 1963.165 The following day, as George
Wallace made his notorious stand at the schoolhouse door, the Court
scheduled oral arguments for the week of November 12. With the 1964
election looming, the Court stood ready to answer these questions.
III. REYNOLDS
Through the summer and fall of ’63, the Court noted probable
jurisdiction on two more cases—one from Delaware, the other from
Colorado. The Delaware case, Roman v. Sinnock, asked whether
malapportionment could be justified by the state’s original compact, dating
back to the time when the three counties in the state had created the state.166
This was an easy case, and many observers wondered why the Court had
accepted this case at all. The Court ultimately voted 8–1 to strike down
Delaware’s plan.167 Only Justice Harlan dissented.
The Colorado case would prove conceptually difficult. One of the
leading reasons that led some of the Justices to vote with the majority in
Baker was the lack of available avenues of reform. This was a classic
legislative straight-jacket. The Colorado case would force the Court to test
that position. The redistricting plan at issue in Lucas v. Forty-Fourth
General Assembly of Colorado had been passed by a state-wide initiative,
and it had only resulted in small population inequalities.168 The case would
ask the Justices to consider whether majorities within a state could choose
for themselves whether to redistrict under terms other than population.
As the Justices looked to the future and the resolution of these various
cases, a Brennan clerk, Stephen Barnett, wrote a 350-page brief that
ultimately became the Justices’ guide.169 After parsing through every
judicial standard proposed by judges, scholars, and commentators, Barnett
settled on Solicitor General Cox’s standard as the only acceptable standard.
This was the “arbitrary and capricious” standard that Cox had advocated in
the Baker litigation and which he continued to advocate moving forward,

165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Reynolds v. Sims, 374 U.S. 802 (1963) (mem).
Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695 (1964).
Id. at 712.
See Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly of Colo., 377 U.S. 713, 715 (1964).
See ANSOLABEHERE & SNYDER, supra note 153, at 172.
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whether in briefs, internal memoranda, or future oral arguments. Cox did
not wish for the Court to adopt a strict population standard, and thus
invalidate a majority of state legislatures then in existence. Instead,
population would provide an initial benchmark through which to evaluate
redistricting plans. States may deviate from population equality, but they
must have a legitimate and rational reason for doing so.
The virtues of this standard were obvious. Chief among them was its
flexibility. This was also its main drawback, because it would lead to
inconsistent results. It would permit some grossly malapportioned plans, as
in the New York litigation, while striking down fairer plans, as in the
Virginia case. The standard lacked consistency, which depending on how
one viewed the Court’s intervention, could be a virtue, but could also be a
negative. This was precisely the virtue offered by strict population equality,
a standard preferred by some Justices and many of the reformers. The
standard would certainly be consistent, and it would also be easy to
implement.
This was the choice facing the Court on November 12, 1963, when it
heard oral arguments over the course of four days on five cases: Reynolds
v. Sims,170 which challenged the apportionment of the Alabama state
legislature; WMCA v. Lomenzo,171 a case challenging New York’s
apportionment formula; Maryland Committee for Fair Representation v.
Tawes,172 challenging Maryland’s malapportionment; Davis v. Mann,173
which challenged Virginia’s apportionment statute; and Wesberry v.
Sanders,174 the Georgia congressional case. The Court devoted nearly
sixteen hours, over the course of five days, to the question of legislative
apportionment. This was unprecedented for a single issue in the Court’s
history.
The argument split along familiar issues. The reformers pointed to
population as the starting point. According to Chuck Morgan, the lead
attorney in Reynolds,
the one standard that is measurable in each instance leaving the less
room for doubt and the less room for question insofar as each of
the state legislatures of this nation are concerned, is the
ascertainable standard of how many people are there in a

170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

377 U.S. 533 (1964).
377 U.S. 633 (1964).
377 U.S. 656 (1964).
377 U.S. 678 (1964).
376 U.S. 1 (1964).
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legislative district or how many people are there in a representative
seat.175
The Court might allow “administrative deviation,” but the leeway must not
be “gross.”176 In addition, the reformers were largely willing to follow the
federal analogy, and thus allow more flexibility in one of the two state
houses. Not so for John McConnell or Chuck Morgan, who told the
Justices that population must be the basis for both houses of a state
legislature. But they were clearly in the minority.
Expectedly, Solicitor General Cox offered the Justices a flexible
standard. He also began with population as the baseline and the “crazy
quilt” test. He argued further that equal protection is violated when the state
incorporates a rule that expressly violates constitutional limits, or is
invidious or else “irrelevant to any permissible purpose of legislative
apportionment.”177 Finally, a reapportionment plan may not subordinate
representation to a degree that results in minority rule. Cox wanted the
Justices to decide no more than necessary. As for the future, he counseled
“that what guidelines there are should emerge from deciding the minimum
required in each of these cases and that the invitation to set forth general
abstract rule is not one that I’m pressing in front of the Court.”178
Predictably, attorneys for the state defended their plans. Some of the
attorneys argued that their states’ plans were in fact rational. This was a
difficult argument. In the Alabama case, the state Attorney General,
Richmond Flowers, conceded as much:
I do not believe that there is a citizen or an official of Alabama that
could argue under any shadow of fairness or justice that
apportionment of the legislature of Alabama under the 1901
Constitution as it is here today or as when this suit started is
anything but unfair, unjust and even approaches the ridiculous.179
The attorneys also asked the Court to reconsider Baker v. Carr. And
they pointed out that no objective criteria existed; to decide these cases was
to take sides in political disputes. That is, “[i]f you go strictly to a
population basis, then the larger, or densely populated counties, would have
a stranglehold on the Alabama Legislature on a one man, one vote basis
175. Oral Argument Part 1 at 58:16, Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (No. 23),
http://www.oyez.org/cases/1960-1969/1963/1963_23 [hereinafter Reynolds Oral Argument].
176. Id. at 30:35.
177. Oral Argument Part 1 at 62:28, WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633 (1964) (No. 20),
http://www.oyez.org/cases/1960-1969/1963/1963_20.
178. Oral Argument Part 1 at 64:48, Md. Comm. For Fair Representation v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656
(1964) (No. 29), http://www.oyez.org/cases/1960-1969/1963/1963_29.
179. Reynolds Oral Argument, supra note 175, at 39:09.
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and the people in the rural areas would not have any say so in their own
government.”180 There would be no escaping this apparent dilemma.
By the close of the arguments on Tuesday, the choices for the Justices
were thus clear: a Frankfurterian retreat in the face of political risk; a
population rule with varying degrees of rigidity; or a more cautious
approach that allowed for state experimentation. The replacement of Justice
Frankfurter with Justice Goldberg seemed to ensure that the Court would
extend Baker to its logical conclusion. It was not clear quite yet, however,
what that conclusion might be.
In the last conference of the Thanksgiving break, the Justices agreed to
strike down all redistricting plans in their docket. But the Justices had yet
to settle on a standard. Rather than wait for a consensus to emerge, and at
Justice Black’s insistence, the Court decided the Georgia congressional
redistricting case, Wesberry v. Sanders,181 on February 17, 1964.
Georgia congressional districts suffered from the same
malapportionment as most other plans across the country, state and federal,
and for similar reasons. For a way to handle the problem, Justice Black
explicitly turned away from the Fourteenth Amendment and to Article I,
Section Two of the Constitution, which states that House members must be
selected “by the People of the several States.”182 From this language, a sixmember majority concluded that “as nearly as is practicable one man’s vote
in a congressional election is to be worth as much as another’s.”183 To hold
otherwise, and allow vote dilution at the district level, would be in clear
tension with “fundamental ideas of democratic government.”184 It would
also mean that the House was not “elected ‘by the People.’”185
This was a remarkable decision. For one, the Court had explicitly
overruled Colegrove v. Green. Most brazenly, and as Justice Harlan
pointed out in dissent, Wesberry placed into question the constitutionality
of the membership of the House. “I had not expected to witness the day,”
he began his dissent, “when the Supreme Court of the United States would
render a decision which casts grave doubt on the constitutionality of the
composition of the House of Representatives.”186 By his count, the decision
called into question the validity of 398 representatives from 37 states. The
decision, in other words, left “a ‘constitutional’ House of 37 members now
sitting.”187 The Justices were no longer afraid to take on powerful political
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

Id. at 13:24.
376 U.S. 1 (1964).
Id. at 3 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1).
Id. at 7–8.
Id. at 8.
Id.
Id. at 20 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 21.
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institutions, even a coordinate branch of the national government. They had
come a long way since 1946.
More importantly, the Justices had inched a step closer towards
demanding population equality across the country. It was only a matter of
time, even if both Georgia cases could be easily distinguished. Population
would be the starting point. But questions still remained. For example, how
much flexibility would the Justices allow local jurisdictions, if any
flexibility at all? Would the Justices authorize states to follow the federal
analogy? And what role would the “straightjacket” argument play into the
future? That is, might the Justices allow state majorities to allocate seats
across the state away from population?
There was no doubt that after Wesberry, “[t]he reapportionment
revolution was now in full swing.”188 Where the revolution would
ultimately go, and how extensive its demands would be, was left to the pen
and constitutional imagination of the Chief Justice.
The story of Reynolds v. Sims is really the story of Chief Justice
Warren’s odyssey. This is a great yet misunderstood story. In 1948, as
Governor of California and Republican nominee for the vice presidency,
Warren gave a speech that essentially killed efforts to redistrict in the state.
He argued against a strict population basis for representation and for the
value of counties. This was in line with the old debate. “Many California
counties are far more important in the life of the State than their population
bears to the entire population of the State. It is for this reason that I have
never been in favor of restricting the representation in the senate to a
strictly population basis.”189 Instead, he continued, and for “the same
reason that the Founding Fathers of our country gave balanced
representation to the States of the Union—equal representation in one
house and proportionate representation based on population in the other.”190
This was an argument for the federal compromise.
By 1963–1964, however, he appears to have had a change of heart. But
to so argue, or to brand him a hypocrite, as many did at the time, would be
to misunderstand the questions as Earl Warren understood them. He did not
change his mind, nor was he wrong for accepting the federal compromise
during his term as governor. They were not the same questions. In other
words, it is best to understand Warren, and the questions he faced, as
matters of institutional competence and epistemic authority.
As a governor, Warren had to consider the needs of his state as a
whole. He had to balance constituencies, whether urban or rural, north or
south, parties and ideologies. He had to govern a large and complex state.
188. ANSOLABEHERE & SNYDER, supra note 153, at 175.
189. Redistricting: A Warren View in ’48, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., July 6, 1964, at 34.
190. Id.
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Warren himself wrote in his autobiography that the issue as governor “was
frankly a matter of political expediency.”191
In contrast, Chief Justice Warren had to contend with very different
complexities. Once the Court came into the thicket in Baker, it had to find a
line between malapportionments that amount to crazy quilts and those that
remain within rational (i.e., constitutional) limits. In other words, Chief
Justice Warren had to delineate the demands of constitutional equality. This
is how Warren put the distinction to Francis Beytagh, his law clerk at the
time: “I never really thought very much about it then. As a political matter
it seemed to me to be a sensible arrangement. But now, as a constitutional
matter, with the point of view of the responsibilities of a Justice, I kind of
got to look at it differently.”192
A few years ago, while doing research in the Library of Congress, we
made a very interesting find among the papers of Chief Justice Warren: a
handwritten memo delineating his thought process as he arrived at
equipopulation as the proper standard for redistricting units. Warren told
his former law clerk, Jesse Choper, that he had not started with equal
population in mind but “[a]fter a while I just couldn’t see any other way,
any other principle that would handle the situation.”193 The memo offers a
window into how Warren arrived at this decision. Remember the two big
questions he faced: how flexible must the population standard be; and what
to do about the federal analogy, and whether one of the two houses of a
state legislature may deviate from strict population equality? Here was his
answer, in full:
1. There can be no formula for determining whether equal
protection has been afforded.
2. Many laws result in harshness as to some people yet must meet
the test of the Constitution
3. However, we have held in Baker v. Carr that it is our province to
ensure equal protection in this area.
4. We must have some starting point.
5. That starting point is whether it meets our conception of a
Republican form of government
6. The basic factor of a representative form of government is that it
is representative
7. To me that means fair representation of all who are governed
8. We have held in Saunders that as to individuals it means
absolute equality
191.
192.

WARREN, supra note 2, at 310.
BERNARD SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF: EARL WARREN AND HIS SUPREME COURT—A
JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY 504 (1983).
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9. Now we are forced with constitutes fair representation of units
of government
10. That takes us into the complexities of government which
precludes a rigid rule
11. There must be some room for play in the joints
12. But it should not lead us away from the principle of equality
13. So I start with the premise of equal representation
14. The Constitution recognizes it in Article I and 14th
Amendment
15. Therefore in determining constitutionality of any system of
apportionment we must take it by the four corners and determine
whether there has been an effort to achieve equality of
representation
16. If so – ok. If not – unconstitutional
17. This does not tie the states to any form of representation –
bicameral – unicameral
18. It merely means that under whatever the form of representative
government it must be equally rep.
19. To what extent can there be room for play in the joints.
20. Cannot set out all
21. We must relate the question to the political structure of that
state
22. If that structure does not violate constitutional principles, the
method of apportionment can be justified if it does not achieve
invidious discrimination
23. If its basic principle is to accord a maximum amount of home
rule through cities or counties or districts it may do so if it is
approximate equality
24. But it cannot so apportion as to give more power to one than
another on the basis that it is entitled to wield more power than
others.
25. This cannot be done because of
1: the class of citizenship
2: the area involved
3: economic interests
4: rural, urban, etc.
26. All of these considerations are involved in at least one of these
cases
27. The state can provide for representation of every unit but it
cannot limit the size of the representative body so as to
discriminate
28. In the NY case it does exactly that thing
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29. The formula was fixed as of 1894 and so fixed that the more
populous the cities became, the greater the disparity in their
proportionate representation. This is invidious.
30. This is not the so-called federal plan because neither house is
apportioned according to population
31. The NY system is not a crazy quilt system. it is deliberate
discrimination
32. Also there is no adequate political remedy. the constitutional
convention cannot be voted on but once every 20 years and that is
not an adequate remedy.
33. The discrimination is therefore built in.
34. it is now 38% Senate 37% House194
This memo is important for a number of reasons. First is the fact that
well into the spring of 1964, Chief Justice Warren was still trying to figure
out where he stood on these questions. The issue was hardly settled.
Second is his concession that the population standard must be flexible;
“there must be some room for play in the joints.” This is another way of
saying, like Justice Douglas and others before him, that population was
only the starting point. Many Justices, and the Chief Justice must be
included among them, would point to invidious discrimination as the
moment when the state had gone too far. But that was a conclusion, not a
useful standard. Standing alone, the term “invidious discrimination” meant
nothing.
Finally, Warren appears to implicitly accept the federal analogy when
he writes that the New York plan “is not the so-called federal plan because
neither house is apportioned according to population.” Were one of the
houses apportioned on a population basis, it might meet with his approval.
On June 15, 1964, the Justices announced the decision in Reynolds v.
Sims and its companion cases.195 The Chief Justice worried that the leading
case was from the state of Alabama. He did not want the public to think
that he had a vendetta against the South. Perceptions were important. 1964
was the year of Freedom Summer, a voter registration project in
Mississippi, and June 15 in particular was the day that the first three
hundred volunteers arrived. More tragically, Michael Schwerner, Andrew
Goodman, and James Chaney disappeared the next day. Warren had reason
to worry.
But Reynolds offered the Court the cleanest set of facts possible,
unencumbered by side issues. The facts were also familiar ones. The state

194. Notes Made by Chief Justice Warren, Reynolds v. Sims, Earl Warren Papers, Library of
Congress, box 608, file 508.
195. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
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had apportioned back in 1901, in line with the state Constitution, and then
refused to reapportion since.196 The resulting plan was a crazy quilt. Some
counties with populations as large as 109,047 had two representatives in
the state house, as did counties with as few as 13,462. Lowndes County,
with a population of 15,417, had two representatives and one senator. In
contrast, Jefferson County, with a population of 634,864, had seven
representatives and also one senator. The disparities across the state plan
were manifold. The plaintiffs alleged that the disparities amounted to
unconstitutional discrimination under the 14th Amendment and the state
constitution.197
With the benefit of hindsight, Reynolds was almost preordained. But
writing at the time, Anthony Lewis expressed the view that “[f]ew Supreme
Court decisions have stunned this hardened capital city as has yesterday’s
ruling that state legislative districts must be substantially equal in
population.”198 The Supreme Court concluded, in an 8–1 decision, that
population was the constitutional starting point and the controlling criterion
for assessing the constitutionality of state apportionment plans.199 Both
Gray and Wesberry featured prominently in the Court’s decision. In fact,
the Court treated both cases as establishing a constitutional baseline of
equality. Reynolds was only recognizing what prior cases, and our
constitutional history, established as a “fundamental principle of
representative government.”200 This was a baseline of substantial equality,
however. For the future, the question was whether states may move away
from this baseline. This was the question that Reynolds and its companion
cases set out to answer.
This is where the Court’s oft-cited passage makes sense: “Legislators
represent people, not trees or acres. Legislators are elected by voters, not
farms or cities or economic interests.”201 As easily as that, the Court
essentially removed all existing considerations outside of population for
creating legislative districts. To be sure, the Court agreed that a state may
create district lines along existing political subdivision lines. This would
help guard against the creation of gerrymandered districts. But the Court
immediately cautioned that states may not submerge population in the
pursuit of this objective. Justice Harlan dissented precisely on this point.

196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

See id. at 540.
See id. at 541.
Anthony Lewis, Districts Ruling Shocks Capital, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 1964, at 29.
Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 567.
Id. at 560.
Id. at 562.
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In one or another of today’s opinions, the Court declares it
unconstitutional for a State to give effective consideration to any of
the following in establishing legislative districts:
(1) history;
(2) “economic or other sorts of group interests”;
(3) area;
(4) geographical considerations;
(5) a desire “to insure effective representation for sparsely settled
areas”;
(6) “availability of access of citizens to their representatives”;
(7) theories of bicameralism (except those approved by the Court);
(8) occupation;
(9) “an attempt to balance urban and rural power.”
(10) the preference of a majority of voters in the State.
....
I know of no principle of logic or practical or theoretical
politics, still less any constitutional principle, which establishes all
or any of these exclusions. Certain it is that the Court’s opinion
does not establish them.202
The last consideration—“the preference of a majority of voters in the
State”—is particularly troubling.203 This was the principle established by
Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly of Colorado.204 Lucas asked the
Court to consider whether modern-day majorities may relax the equal
population rule as applied to their particular states. This was not Tennessee,
nor was it Alabama or many of the states involved in the reapportionment
cases. But that fact did not make any difference to the Justices, who
responded glibly that “[a] citizen’s constitutional rights can hardly be
infringed simply because a majority of the people choose that it be.”205

202.
203.
204.
205.

Id. at 622–23 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 623.
Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly of Colo., 377 U.S. 713, 713 (1964).
Id. at 736–37.
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Population had thus become the sine qua non of legislative districting. Both
houses of a bicameral state legislature must be apportioned on a population
basis. As a result, Reynolds and its companion cases declared
“unconstitutional the legislatures of most of the 50 States.”206
At root, Reynolds is a deeply ironic case. The Court paid lip service to
the notion that the case sought to protect the right of qualified citizens to
vote, and “to have their votes counted.”207 But Reynolds is best understood
as a governance case. The Court ensured that white suburban majorities
enjoyed the right to govern that was their due. But the irony sets in once we
see how the Court got there. Early in the opinion, Warren essentially turned
to the Fifteenth Amendment, and cases such as Gomillion, the White
Primary Cases,208 U.S. v. Classic,209 and Guinn v. United States,210 in order
to recognize a Fourteenth Amendment governance right.211 Majorities have
a right to govern, and minorities are amply protected by our constitutional
system. Representative government demands no less.
Looking ahead, vital questions remained.212 How strictly would the
Court apply the equality principle? Would the case extend to other
institutions, such as city councils, county commissions, or school boards?
And finally, would the Court continue on the road to political equality and
“seek to apply constitutional controls to gerrymandering”?213 This was a
much harder question, and seemed “far less amenable to constitutional
adjudication than apportioning numbers of representatives to geographical
districts.”214 This was the next logical step in the reapportionment
revolution. And after Wesberry and Reynolds, was there anything the Court
could not do?
In an internal memorandum to Attorney General Kennedy in August
1963, Solicitor General Cox offered his prediction about the
reapportionment revolution. He stated: “[M]y appraisal of sentiment within
the legal profession – and probably outside – is that while the invalidation
of the egregiously malapportioned legislatures would command a
consensus of opinion, a ‘one man—one vote’ decision would precipitate a
major constitutional crisis causing an enormous drop in public support for

206. Id. at 746 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
207. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 554.
208. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Nixon v.
Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
209. 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
210. 238 U.S. 347 (1915).
211. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 554–555.
212. See ARCHIBALD COX, THE WARREN COURT: CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION AS AN
INSTRUMENT OF REFORM 120–23 (1968).
213. Id. at 123.
214. Id.
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the Court.”215 This is a prediction in line with earlier concerns expressed by
Justices Homes and Frankfurter, and even Alexander Hamilton in his wellknown Federalist 78216: the Court must be cautious in its approach to
questions of politics. The Justices have neither the sword nor the purse, but
only judgment and the belief that their decisions are demanded by higher
law. They must never compromise this belief.
Solicitor General Cox’s concerns were ultimately misplaced.
Compliance was almost immediate, almost unparalleled in the history of
the Court. According to Herbert Wechsler, in fact, “no decision in the
history of the judicial process ever has achieved so much so soon.”217
Crucially, the equipopulation revolution was positively received by the
public at large. The public supported the Court in great numbers.218 In fact,
as far as public opinion was concerned, Reynolds was an unqualified
success.
As expected, elite opinion responded very differently. Writing in the
summer of 1964, Anthony Lewis explained that “[t]he curious thing about
the current furor . . . is that [Reynolds] cannot really be shown to have
aroused large-scale opposition among the public . . . . This would seem to
be strictly a politicians’ rebellion.”219 The reaction began soon after the
Court decided Baker v. Carr, when the Council of State Governments
proposed three constitutional amendments. The Council came two states
short of the thirty-four states needed to call a constitutional convention.220
In specific response to Reynolds, the 1964 Republican platform called for
“a Constitutional amendment, as well as legislation, enabling states having
bicameral legislatures to apportion one House on bases of their choosing,
including factors other than population.”221
During the presidential campaign that year, Barry Goldwater similarly
criticized the Court as part of his larger critique about the Warren Court
and its judicial overreaching. He complained that the reapportionment
cases would “have a more dangerous effect than anything that’s happened

215. SMITH, supra note 162, at 165 (quoting Memorandum from Solicitor Gen. Archibald Cox to
Attorney Gen. Robert F. Kennedy 18–19 (Aug. 19, 1963).
216. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
217. Herbert Wechsler, The Nationalization of Civil Liberties and Civil Rights, 12 TEX. Q. 25
(Supp. 1968).
218. See Joshua Fougere, Stephen Ansolabehere & Nathaniel Persily, Partisanship, Public
Opinion, and Redistricting, 9 ELECTION L.J. 325, 325 (2010).
219. Anthony Lewis, Congress v. the Court – Issue Joined on Redistricting, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
16, 1964, at E3.
220. See ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, THE STATES RIGHTS DEBATE: ANTIFEDERALISM AND THE
CONSTITUTION (1964).
221. William G. Ross, The Role of Judicial Issues in Presidential Campaigns, 42 SANTA CLARA
L. REV. 391, 428 (2002) (quoting DONALD BRUCE JOHNSON, 2 NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS, 1960–
1976, at 686 (1978)).
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throughout the course of our Republic.”222 More specifically, he argued that
Reynolds would “destroy the representative vote of the small States,
populationwise. It’s going to destroy the suburban vote . . . the farmer, the
miner, the forester’s vote, and place it all in the concentration of bosscontrolled cities, mostly in the East . . . where we find crime on the
streets.”223
Congressional leaders responded similarly.224 Multiple bills were
introduced in Congress limiting the jurisdiction of the Court or delaying
implementation of court orders. The Senate even took the unusual step of
reducing a pay increase for the Justices by $5,000. Senator Dirksen led the
opposition in the Senate, introducing a constitutional amendment that
mirrored the 1964 Republican platform. But Dirksen could not secure the
requisite two-thirds majority. Dirksen re-introduced an amendment the
following year, which fell nine votes short. Dirksen tried a third time. By
the summer of 1966, however, forty-six states had complied with the
Court’s ruling and the four remaining states were expected to comply in the
near future. The fight appeared over. Senator Dirksen then attempted to call
a constitutional convention but could not reach the requisite number of
states by the time of his death in 1969. The reapportionment revolution was
not only underway but almost over even as it began. Few were left to put
up a fight.
IV. REYNOLDS AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY
An important question about Reynolds and the reapportionment
revolution is whether the Court’s intervention made much of a difference in
terms of changing policy and the distribution of resources. The political
science literature on the policy and electoral consequences of the
reapportionment revolution has been all over the map. Moreover, the
results may differ depending upon whether one is looking at the effects of
malapportionment of the state legislatures or the effect of
malapportionment of the United States House of Representatives. Scholars
critical of malapportionment generally argued that “legislative
malapportionment is largely responsible for or connected with lack of party
competition, divided government, unfair distribution of funds, and

222. Id. at 429 (quoting Barry M. Goldwater, Speech Before the Committee on Commerce,
United States Senate, 89th Cong. 1st Sess., in 3 CAMPAIGN ’64. THE SPEECHES, REMARKS, PRESS
CONFERENCES, AND RELATED PAPERS OF SENATOR BARRY M. GOLDWATER, JULY 16 THROUGH
NOVEMBER 4, 1964, at 170 (1965)).
223. Id.
224. For a terrific account of this reaction, see RICHARD C. CORTNER, THE APPORTIONMENT
CASES (1970), chapter 9.
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unprogressive legislation.”225 As Ward Elliott wrote in an early assessment
of the reapportionment revolution:
In 1962 it was conventional wisdom among the cognoscenti . . .
that Malapportionment was to blame for the worst problems of
government at every level. It was supposed to have reduced city
dwellers to second-class citizens, and to have stifled urgently
needed reforms like home rule, slum clearance, metropolitan
transit, annexation, labor and welfare legislation, civil rights laws,
equal tax laws, and equal expenditures on schools and roads.226
One political scientist, writing after Baker but before the bulk of the
Court’s reapportionment decisions, expected the reapportionment
revolution to have at least three effects.227 First, at the very least,
reapportionment at the state level was expected to increase the
representation of urban and suburban areas over that of rural areas.228
Second, reapportionment was expected to impact the political structure of
the state and affect the competition between the two dominant parties.229
Third, reapportionment was expected to have distributional effects on state
public policy.230 In particular, observers expected reapportionment to
produce public policy benefits that reflected the preferences of urban and
suburban voters. It is the third expectation of reapportionment that captured
the attention of most researchers.
Early work by numerous political scientists concluded that
reapportionment did not or was not likely to have any distributional effects,
especially at the state level.231 For example, Thomas Dye’s study, which
sought to determine the effects of malapportionment on both the public
225. Herbert Jacob, The Consequences of Malapportionment: A Note of Caution, 43 SOC.
FORCES 256, 257 (1964) (listing the defects most attributed to malapportionment in the late fifties and
early sixties).
226. Ward Elliott, Prometheus, Proteus, Pandora, and Procrustes Unbound: The Political
Consequences of Reapportionment, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 474, 474–75 (1970).
227. Malcolm E. Jewel, Political Pattern in Apportionment, in POLITICS OF REAPPORTIONMENT
1 (1962).
228. Id. at 17–18.
229. Id. at 19–21.
230. Id. at 18–19.
231. See, e.g., David Brady & Douglas Edmonds, One Man, One Vote—so What?, 4
TRANSACTION 941 (1967); Glen T. Broach, A Comparative Dimensional Voting Analysis of Partisan
and Urban-Rural Voting in States Legislatures, 34 J. POL. 905, 920 (1972); Thomas R. Dye,
Malapportionment and Public Policy in the States, 27 J. POL. 586, 599 (1965); Robert S. Erikson, The
Partisan Impact of State Legislative Reapportionment, 15 MIDWEST J. POL. SCI. 57, 57 (1971); Brian R.
Fry & Richard F. Winters, The Politics of Redistribution, 64 AM. J. POL. SCI. 508, 522 (1970); Richard
I. Hofferbert, The Relation Between Public Policy and Some Structural and Environmental Variables in
the American States, 60 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 73 (1966); Jacob, supra note 225, at 256; David Knoke &
Constance Henry, Political Structure of Rural America, 429 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 51,
57 (1977).

5 CHARLES 485-535 (DO NOT DELETE)

524

1/22/2016 3:17 PM

Alabama Law Review

[Vol. 67:2:485

policy in all fifty states and on party competition, concluded that “the
policy choices of malapportioned legislatures are not noticeably different
from the policy choices of well-apportioned legislatures.”232 But the
conclusions of the early studies were not uniform. Some scholars were able
to find political and distributional effects. For example, Robert Erikson’s
study of the impact of reapportionment on the party composition of state
legislatures concluded that reapportionment helped the Democratic Party
gain seats at the expense of the Republican Party.233 The partisan effect was
particularly pronounced in the most malapportioned states. Similarly,
Douglas Fieg concluded that reapportionment was responsible for
increased state expenditures in local education and in public welfare.234
Feig’s study was part of a growing list of early work that found at least
some effects of reapportionment and also raised questions about the
methodological limitations of some of the earlier studies.235
As a general matter, later studies, many using more sophisticated
methodological analysis, have been less equivocal about the effects of
reapportionment. For example, Mathew McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz
concluded that reapportionment impacted Congressional budget allocations
in favor of metropolitan areas and against urban areas.236 The McCubbins
and Schwartz study is one of several important recent studies reinforcing
the conclusion that the design of electoral institutions matter.237 The

232. Dye, supra note 231.
233. Erikson, supra note 231.
234. Douglas G. Feig, Expenditures in the American States: The Impact of Court-Ordered
Legislative Reapportionment, 6 AM. POL. Q. 309, 320 (1978).
235. See, e.g., Roger A. Hanson & Robert E. Crew, Jr., The Policy Impact of Reapportionment, 8
L. & SOC’Y REV. 69, 90 (1974); Allan G. Pulsipher & James L. Weatherby, Jr., Malapportionment,
Party Competition, and the Functional Distribution of Government Expenditures, 62 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 1207, 1219 (1968); Jack L. Walker, The Diffusion of Innovations Among the American States, 62
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 880, 896–99 (1969).
236. Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congress, the Courts, and Public Policy:
Consequences of One Man, One Vote Rule, 32 AM. J. POL. SCI. 388, 409–12 (1988). McCubbins and
Schwartz found that the congressional redistricting that occurred as a consequence of the
reapportionment cases contributed to the reallocation of federal policy benefits from rural to non-rural
citizens. They pointed to shifts in agricultural, regulatory, and transportation as reflecting substantive
benefits wrought by congressional reapportionment in favor of non-rural residents.
237. See, e.g., STEPHEN ANSOLABEHERE & JAMES M. SNYDER JR., THE END OF INEQUALITY:
ONE PERSON, ONE VOTE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN POLITICS (2008); GARY W. COX &
JONATHAN N. KATZ, ELBRIDGE GERRY’S SALAMANDER: THE ELECTORAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE
REAPPORTIONMENT REVOLUTION 6 (2002); Stephen Ansolabehere & James M. Snyder Jr.,
Reapportionment and Party Realignment in the American States, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 433, 453–56
(2004); Jeffrey R. Lax & Mathew D. McCubbins, Courts, Congress, and Public Policy, Part II: The
Impact of the Reapportionment Revolution on Congress and State Legislatures, 15 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
ISSUES 199, 206 (2006); Nathaniel Persily, Thad Kousser & Patrick Egan, The Complicated Impact of
One Person, One Vote on Political Competition and Representation, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1299, 1351–52
(2002).
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reapportionment revolution mattered for political representation,238 it
mattered for politics,239 and it mattered for public policy.240
Though it is true that Baker, Reynolds, and the reapportionment cases
are important because of their impact on the political process, it is also true
that the impact of the reapportionment revolution was not sufficiently
systematic and was too contextual for the reapportionment cases to be
notable on the basis of their political impact alone. Thus, in assessing the
reapportionment cases, it is not sufficient to consider political impact alone.
Baker, Reynolds, and the apportionment cases are consequential because
they represent the promise that courts are a necessary and credible
institution for addressing the inevitable pathologies of democratic politics.
If the Court can compel the restructuring of the political institutions of the
upper and lower houses in all of the states, the House of Representatives,
and even local governmental units such as school districts, how can there
be any limits to the questions that the Court can or should tackle?241 The
reapportionment cases created an expectation of the Court as a deus ex
machina, an exogenous force, the god that would deliver us all from the
predicaments created by our political rulers. This is a legacy of the
reapportionment cases, the Court is always part of the background
discussion on questions of law in politics, no matter the question.
Additionally, and relatedly, Baker, Reynolds, and the reapportionment
cases reflect the lens through which the Court and students of law and
politics understand the terms of judicial involvement in democratic politics.
The foundational questions and tensions that attend the Court’s
involvement in supervising democratic politics have their roots in the
reapportionment cases. We describe these tensions as dualities and
dichotomies. Each duality pulls the Court in two opposing directions.
Moreover, the dualities are non-ideological. That is, sometimes the liberals
or the conservatives on the Court will prefer one side of the duality and
sometimes they’ll prefer the other. Outcomes do not invariably track one
side of the duality. These dualities enable the pull-push dynamic that
sometimes attends the Court’s law and politics jurisprudence. These
dualities also provide some explanation for why there is often so little
consistency in the Court’s law and politics jurisprudence and why it is

238. See, e.g., Persily et al., supra note 237.
239. See, e.g., COX & KATZ, supra note 237.
240. See, e.g., McCubbins & Schwartz, supra note 236.
241. See, e.g., Persily et al., supra note 237, at 1303 & n.14 (“One could view Baker as setting
the stage for the Court’s intervention into the arenas of campaign finance, ballot access, vote dilution,
race and redistricting, political party regulation, and even creating the right to vote.”).
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extremely difficult to articulate an overarching theory of the Court’s
jurisprudence in this area.242
Take first the preliminary question of whether courts ought to have a
role as supervisors of the ground rules of democratic politics. Until the
reapportionment cases—that is, for the vast majority of the history of the
United States—the Supreme Court refrained from refereeing disputes over
the ground rules of the political process. This posture was understandable
for many reasons. The Constitution has very little to say about the types of
political disputes that have eventually found their way onto the Court’s
docket. This includes disputes over political representation, the
apportionment of political power, the cabining of political power, the
criteria pursuant to which the state can determine who can participate in
democratic politics, and the like. Moreover, when the Constitution speaks
clearly about the ground rules of democratic politics, its prescriptions are
often as much to state as to federal actors.243 And those directives are
clearly to legislatures and not to courts. When the Constitution’s
prescriptions are more ambiguous, it is unclear whether its directives are
aimed in any way toward courts or whether they are exclusively concerned
with guiding the behavior of other democratic actors.244 Further still, even
where the Constitution seems to speak to courts, for example in the area of
racial discrimination in voting per the Fifteenth Amendment, courts, in
comparison to legislatures, have limited institutional ability to root out
entrenched structural discrimination. It was not until the passage of the
Voting Rights Act of 1965 that the United States made significant progress
on reducing racial discrimination in voting, notwithstanding the adoption of
the Fifteenth Amendment in 1870.245 As compared to legislatures, courts
may be at an institutional disadvantage in addressing the structural
pathologies of the political process.
Thus, for a very long time, the Court’s official position on the question
of supervision of democratic politics was one of institutional abstention.
Institutional abstention, as judicial posture, is animated by the general
worry that the Court, because of a particularly unique institutional fragility,
is a specifically vulnerable institution when it engages democratic politics.
This posture of judicial restraint is justified by a number of rationalizations,
242. One explanation for why it is difficult to articulate the Court’s overarching theory of
democratic politics and to ascertain its contours is because the Court does not have one. See, e.g., James
A. Gardner, Partitioning and Rights: The Supreme Court’s Accidental Jurisprudence of Democratic
Process, 42 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 61 (2014).
243. See, e.g., id. at 73.
244. See, for example, the Guarantee Clause in Article IV, Section 4, which the Court has held
nonjusticiable. See Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849) (holding that Guarantee Clause claims
are nonjusticiable political questions).
245. See, e.g., Guy-Uriel E. Charles and Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, The Voting Rights Act in Winter:
The Death of a Superstatute, 100 IOWA L. REV. 1389 (2015).
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reflecting an assumption about the nature of the Court’s institutional
fragility, such as the Court’s sense of its own institutional impotence, or
that the Court does not have a constitutional mandate to decide democratic
disputes,246 or that the Court lacks the institutional competence to resolve
fundamental democratic questions,247 or that it is politically prudent for the
Court to absent itself from political disputes among the political branches248
so as not to politicize the Court in a way that would undermine the Court’s
core functions,249 or whatever justification that would rationalize
institutional abstention. Whatever the justification, the pull of judicial
abstention facilitated the Court’s hands-off approach to the problems of
democratic politics.
But the pull of judicial abstention was not and is not a unique force.
The pressure that the Court as an institution has experienced and continues
to experience with respect to its role in democratic politics is not
unidirectional. The Court was and is also being pulled, in the opposite
direction, by a similarly powerful force urging the Court to engage in the
political process. Tugging the Court away from abstention is a force that
we will call judicial democratic exceptionalism, which is the conception
that the Court is the only institution capable of resolving the pathologies of
the political process. At the heart of exceptionalism is the contention that
the Court is uniquely situated as an institution to supervise the democratic
process because the Court is inoculated from whatever the pathology du
jour that is afflicting the democratic processes and leading to the current
political problem.
Sometimes the Court gives in to abstention, sometimes it gives in to
exceptionalism. Like institutional abstention, the justifications for judicial
exceptionalism are manifold. Justifications include the argument that the
Constitution has assigned a particular role to the Court, or John Hart Ely’s
process theory, or the Issacharoff-Pildes partisan lock-up theory, or some
notion of constitutional pluralism,250 or political theory, or a
straightforward articulation of the principal-agent problem,251 or, as in Bush
v. Gore, the argument that Court is the only institution that can resolve a

246. See RICHARD L. HASEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND ELECTION
FROM BAKER V. CARR TO BUSH V. GORE 71–72, 139, 153–54 (2003).

LAW: JUDGING EQUALITY

247. Heather K. Gerken & Michael S. Kang, Déjà vu all over Again: Courts, Corporate Law,
and Election Law, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 86 (2013); Michael S. Kang, When Courts Won’t Make Law:
Partisan Gerrymandering and a Structural Approach to the Law of Democracy, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1097,
1099–1100 (2007).
248. See generally Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Doing Our Politics in Court: Gerrymandering, “Fair
Representation” and an Exegesis into the Judicial Role, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 527 (2003).
249. See generally Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Constitutional Pluralism and Democratic Politics:
Reflections on the Interpretive Approach of Baker v. Carr, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1103 (2002).
250. See, e.g., id.
251. D. Theodore Rave, Politicians as Fiduciaries, 126 HARV. L. REV. 671 (2013).
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political impasse, or whatever justification that would rationalize the
Court’s engagement with democratic politics.
Judicial democratic exceptionalism is the product of the
reapportionment cases, though some might argue that it has its roots earlier
in the cases addressing racial discrimination in the political process, cases
such as Gomillion v. Lightfoot and the White Primary Cases. A recurring
question in the Court’s law and politics cases and in the field of law and
politics is whether we learn anything about the Court’s ability to regulate
democratic politics from the Court’s cases addressing racial discrimination
in the political process.252 The Court itself has been split on that question.
In Colegrove v. Green, the Frankfurter-led majority argued that the racial
cases were inapposite.253 In Baker v. Carr, the Brennan-led majority relied
heavily on Gomillion v. Lightfoot in support of its argument that political
equality cases were justiciable.254 The racial cases are particularly relevant
to the institutional exceptionalism argument because they arrived at a time
when the political processes were completely unresponsive to the menace
of racial discrimination in democratic politics, as well as in all areas of
life.255 Thus, the contention that the Court was the only available option
and that it had an obligation to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment’s
prohibition on race discrimination in voting was compelling. Nevertheless,
even if one believed that Gomillion, the White Primary Cases, and other
racial discrimination cases offered a glimpse of the possibilities for judicial
intervention, the reapportionment cases were gamechangers.
Reynolds was a moment of creation.256 In Gomillion and the White
Primary Cases the Court selectively intervened in the political process to
tackle particular instances of local discrimination and negative state laws or
local ordinances. In Reynolds and the reapportionment cases, the Court
sought to remake the electoral processes of the nation and imposed its will
on the whole country—all of the states, including local electoral structures,
and the United States House of Representatives. The Court acted boldly
and muscularly in Reynolds in order to curb the worst political excesses.
Reynolds is similar to the Warren-era case that preceded it, Brown v.
Board of Education.257 Brown sought to restructure American society to
make it consistent with the Court’s understanding of the Constitution’s
conception of racial equality. Brown was obviously a critical intervention.

252. See, e.g., Vieth v. Jubilerer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
253. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 552 (1946).
254. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 229–31 (1962).
255. We will return shortly to the question of whether race is an appropriate guide for political
participation cases that do not involve race.
256. See generally Roy A. Schotland, The Limits of Being “Present at the Creation”, 80 N.C. L.
REV. 1505 (2002).
257. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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Likewise, Reynolds sought to restructure the political process to make it
consistent with the Court’s understanding of the Constitution’s conception
of political equality. It too was a critical intervention. Both cases hover like
a brooding omnipresence over American society and American politics
respectively. Their appearance promised much and they were full of
possibilities.
The Court’s aggressive posture in regulating the Law of Democracy
remains with us to this day. Reynolds raised the expectation that there is no
aspect of democratic politics that is off limits to judicial intervention. If the
Court could intervene in the political process in this way, in such grand
fashion, and arguably so successfully, the Court must be uniquely
positioned to resolve any and all of the excesses of democratic politics.
This is how the Court ended up resolving a presidential dispute in the 2000
Presidential elections. Reynolds is the umbilical cord that nourished Bush v.
Gore. “The Court’s initial incursion into the political thicket convinced it
that the judiciary, and not the political process, even once it had been freed
of the stranglehold of malapportionment, should continually regulate the
fundamental rules of political engagement. In short, one person, one vote
has encouraged the Court’s hubris.”258 This is the expectation that Reynolds
and the reapportionment cases created.259
Reynolds birthed institutional exceptionalism and by doing so, it
created the tension with an equally strong expectation of judicial
abstention, rooted in almost 150 years of judicial inaction in democratic
politics. With each issue, the Court is now confronted with two opposing
and arguably equal impulses, abstention and exception. This is the first
duality.
A second duality is one very familiar to law and it is the traditional
debate between rules versus standards.260 When a Court or decisionmaker is
applying a legal directive to resolve a problem, such as the regulation of
democratic politics including democratic politics, it must decide what legal
directive applies to the problem or it must prescribe some legal directive to
guide judges, other political actors, and other interested observers.261 For
258. Pamela S. Karlan & Daniel R. Ortiz, Constitutional Farce, in CONSTITUTIONAL
STUPIDITIES, CONSTITUTIONAL TRAGEDIES 180 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Sanford V. Levinson eds.,
1998).
259. To return to the Brown analogy, from our view, neither case lived up to the expectation that
it engendered that it would fully remake American society in its respective domain. The Court has never
tackled systematic racial discrimination in American life in the manner in promised by Brown.
Similarly, the Court has never tackled political inequality in the deep transformative manner promised
by Reynolds.
260. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557
(1992); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Justices of Rule and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22 (1992).
261. See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 260, at 57 (“Law translates background social policies or
political principles such as truth, fairness, efficiency, autonomy, and democracy into a grid of legal
directives that decisionmakers in turn apply to particular cases and facts.”).
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example, in the reapportionment context, when the Court decided that the
design of electoral institutions was subject to a constitutional command of
political equality, it had to articulate the substantive content of that
command. In formulating the substantive content of the command, the
Court also had to decide the level of specificity at which it would articulate
the directive, whether the directive would be articulated at a very high level
of generality—a standard—or high degree of specificity—a rule.
From the rules/standards literature we know that there are costs and
benefits to both approaches. “Rules are more costly to promulgate than
standards because rules involve advance determinations of the law’s
content, whereas standards are more costly for legal advisors to predict or
enforcement authorities to apply because they require later determinations
of the law’s content.”262 If it is important to know the content of a legal
directive ex ante for a problem that recurs frequently, then a rule is
generally better than a standard. If a legal directive is being applied to a
problem that is varied and complex with multiple permutations and
knowledge about the content of the legal directive is easily learned ex post,
a standard is generally better than a rule. Rules are thought to limit
discretion, whereas standards facilitate discretion and allow decisionmakers
to take into account a range of factors, especially when the decisionmaker
is trustworthy.263
When the Court decided to intervene in democratic politics in 1964, the
Supreme Court faced a challenging and classic choice between standards
and rules.264 One option was to follow the path left open in Baker v. Carr.
This path would posit the Court as deferential to political decisions made
elsewhere and would warrant intervention only when the resulting
discrimination “reflects no policy, but simply arbitrary and capricious
action.”265 This was a “well developed and familiar”266 judicial standard. A
second option was for the Court to impose a more aggressive and assertive
set of principles on state legislatures. The obvious candidate for adoption
was the “one person, one vote” rule. The Court chose a rule in Reynolds,
though it could have easily chosen a standard.

262. Kaplow, supra note 260, at 562–63.
263. Sullivan, supra note 260, at 57.
264. See Spencer Overton, Rules, Standards, and Bush v. Gore: Form and the Law of
Democracy, 37 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 65, 78–79 (2002); Sullivan, supra note 260.
265. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 226 (1962).
266. Id.; see also Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 673 (1966) (Black, J.,
dissenting) (“The equal protection cases carefully analyzed boil down to the principle that distinctions
drawn and even discriminations imposed by state laws do not violate the Equal Protection Clause so
long as these distinctions and discriminations are not ‘irrational,’ ‘irrelevant,’ ‘unreasonable,’
‘arbitrary,’ or ‘invidious.’”); ELY, supra note 8, at 121 (stating that “the usual demand of the Equal
Protection Clause is simply that the discrimination in question be rationally explainable”).
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“One person, one vote” was an attractive option, not least because it
was a terrific slogan to rally the nation behind the Court and the Court’s
latest incursion into a new and quite difficult political terrain. One person,
one vote seemed like a universal constitutional principle of equality. As a
constitutional principle, it had intuitive appeal. Moreover, and as
importantly, it was administrable; lower courts could easily apply it.267
“One person, one vote” became the law of the land.
The Warren Court took what appeared to be the path of least resistance.
We sympathize with the Court’s initial impulse. Were the Court to
implement a rationality standard, its role in political questions of this sort
would seem interminable, messy, even unbounded. Every redistricting plan
would be the subject of litigation and outcomes might be difficult to
decipher a priori. In contrast, “one person, one vote” offered the promise of
surgical intervention,268 a rule that even a sixth grader might apply.269 It is
rigid, to be sure, but simple to apply and predictable in its results.
Consequently, and most importantly, the rule would allow courts to play a
lessened role into the future. This is an area where the Justices inevitably
face criticisms that political considerations and ideology influence their
decisions. Rules shield the Justices from these criticisms.
But in choosing rules over standards in Reynolds and in the
reapportionment cases, the Court may have either intuited that law and
politics disputes are best addressed via rules or the Court may have created
a preference for using rules to decide law and politics disputes. Whether the
Court’s reach for the one person, one vote principle reflects its intuition
that law and politics disputes are best resolved by the articulation of a rule
as opposed to a standard, or whether the Court created an expectation in
Reynolds that law and politics disputes will be resolved via rules over
standards, a preference for rules over standards seems to exist in election
law. Consider some examples.
The Court has declined to impose limits on the problem of political
gerrymandering in large part because it has not been able to settle on the
267. But “the more troublesome question,” as John Hart Ely famously quipped, “is what else it
has to recommend it.” See ELY, supra note 8, at 121; see also Sanford Levinson, One Person, One Vote:
A Mantra in Need of Meaning, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1269, 1270 (2002) (“My goal in this Essay is to express
some of my own uncertainties about what the term one person, one vote actually does, or, just as much
to the point, should, mean.”).
268. But maybe not. See Heather K. Gerken, The Costs and Causes of Minimalism in Voting
Cases: Baker v. Carr and Its Progeny, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1411, 1441 (2002) (“[B]right-line rules may []
result in more widespread judicial interference in the political process than broad theories because only
the latter offer grounds for discerning sensible limiting principles and making contextual judgments
regarding application of the equality norm.”).
269. Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly of Colo., 377 U.S. 713, 750 (1964) (Stewart, J.,
joined by Clark, J., dissenting) (complaining that “the Court says that the requirements of the Equal
Protection Clause can be met in any State only by the uncritical, simplistic, and heavy-handed
application of sixth-grade arithmetic”).
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political gerrymandering analog to reapportionment’s one person, one vote
principle.270 In Vieth v. Jubilerer,271 four Justices concluded that political
gerrymandering claims were not justiciable because “no judicially
discernible and manageable standards for adjudicating political
gerrymandering claims” currently exists.272 These four, Justice Scalia, who
penned the controlling plurality opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and
Justices O’Connor and Thomas, were interested in a rule similar to the one
person, one vote rule. Four other Justices would find political
gerrymandering claims justiciable.273 These four, Justices Stevens, Breyer,
Souter, and Ginsburg, were comfortable articulating a standard to decide
such claims, though they articulated three different standards among
them.274 The ninth Justice, Justice Kennedy, agreed with the plurality that
the plaintiffs’ claims must be dismissed, but disagreed with the plurality
that political gerrymandering claims were not justiciable.275 Justice
Kennedy concluded that a non-justiciability determination would be
premature because of the possibility that “some limited and precise
rationale” might emerge that would enable courts to decide these
disputes.276 Tempted by the allure of the one person, one vote principle,
Justice Kennedy longed for “rules to limit and confine judicial
intervention.”277 Reynolds nourished Justice Kennedy’s search for
“principled, well-accepted rules of fairness” and “a manageable standard
for assessing burdens on representational rights.”278 Justice Kennedy
explicitly used the reapportionment cases as direct comparators.279 He
chided the plurality of lacking the “patient approach of Baker v. Carr.”280
Like Banquo’s ghost at Macbeth’s banquet, “one person, one vote” silently,
accusingly, and maddeningly haunts the Court in Vieth.

270. Indeed, some Justices have recognized that malapportionment and partisan gerrymandering
are related problems and understand the equipopulation principle as something of a limitation on
partisan gerrymandering. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. at 578–79 (“indiscriminate districting . . . may
be little more than an open invitation to partisan gerrymandering”); Cox v. Larios, 542 U.S. 947, 949–
50 (2004) (Stevens, J., joined by Breyer, J., concurring) (“After our recent decision in Vieth v.
Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004), the equal-population principle remains the only clear limitation on
improper districting practices, and we must be careful not to dilute its strength.”); Samuel Issacharoff,
Judging Politics: The Elusive Quest for Judicial Review of Political Fairness, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1643,
1648 (1993).
271. 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
272. Id. at 281.
273. See generally id. at 317–368.
274. See id.
275. Id. at 317 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
276. Id. at 306.
277. Id. at 307.
278. Id. at 308.
279. See id. at 311.
280. Id.
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Or consider the campaign finance context. In Buckley v. Valeo, the
Court addressed the constitutionality of Congress’s landmark campaign
finance reform statute, the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1974
(FECA).281 FECA was a comprehensive regulatory scheme that regulated
both the supply of campaign financing and the demand for campaign
supply; FECA imposed monetary caps on both campaign contributions and
campaign expenditures. The Court announced a rule-like framework in
Buckley that has generally governed campaign finance regulations for
almost forty years. Contribution limitations are generally permissible and
expenditure limitations are generally unconstitutional.
Or take section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, which governs the problem
of racial vote dilution. In 1982 Congress amended section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act to provide that “[n]o voting qualification or prerequisite to
voting or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by
any State in a manner which results in a denial or abridgment of the right of
any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color . . . .”282
Subsection (b) of section 2 stated that a plaintiff makes a claim for vote
dilution where “based on the totality of circumstances, it is shown that the
political processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political
subdivision are not equally open to participation” because of race.283 The
Senate Judicial Committee report provided some additional guidance in the
form of a number of “typical factors” that would indicate a violation of
section 2. In promulgating a revised section 2, Congress opted for a
standard (or number of standards) to determine whether section 2 is
violated. But in Thornburg v. Gingles,284 its first case interpreting the
revised section 2, the Court refined Congress’s approach and introduced a
rule-like framework to ascertain racial vote dilution.285 Plaintiffs must
establish three conditions to make out a vote dilution claim post-Gingles.
First, they must show that the minority group is sufficiently large and
compact to fit within a single-member district; second, they must show that
the minority group is politically cohesive; and third, they must show that
the majority group votes as a bloc to defeat the minority group’s candidate
of choice.286 It is not farfetched to attribute section 2’s stunning success to
the Court’s ability to smartly convert an amorphous set of congressional
standards into a rule-like framework in Gingles.
The tug between rules and standards is the second duality. Reynolds
gave rise to (or reflected) a presumed preference for rules over standards,
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.

424 U.S. 1 (1976).
42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (2012).
Id. § 1973(b).
478 U.S. 30 (1986).
See id. at 50–51.
See Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 90–91 (1997).
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even where rules are hard to formulate and standards are ready at hand. The
absence of rules seems to paralyze election law, even in the presence of
standards. One cannot help but wonder whether the Court’s election law
jurisprudence would be more comfortable with standards had the Court
chosen the path opened up in Baker. And one wonders whether a
preference for standards would have led to a much more interventionist role
for the Court in American electoral politics.
The third duality is the race and politics divide. Election law sometimes
struggles to understand how to characterize race-tinged political
controversies. Sometimes election law frames these issues as racial
problems and sometimes it frames them as ordinary conflicts of democratic
politics. These frames matter because the framing itself can often be
outcome-determinative. Recall here the first duality, the Court is often
pulled between abstaining from deciding problems of democratic politics
and believing that it is exceptionally poised to address the pathologies of
democratic politics. This tension does not exist in the race cases. As a
general matter, electoral disputes framed in the register of race are entitled
to judicial attention. The only way to avoid judicial scrutiny is to frame
them in the register of normal politics. Consider here two prominent
examples, Whitcomb v. Chavis287 and White v. Regester.288
In Whitcomb v. Chavis, the plaintiffs sought to invalidate under the
Equal Protection Clause a multimember district in Marion County,
Indiana.289 The plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, that the multimember district
diluted the votes of the African American population located within the
district.290 The Court rejected the claim and reversed the decision of the
district court, in part because it concluded that “there is no suggestion here
that Marion County’s multi-member district, or similar districts throughout
the State, were conceived or operated as purposeful devices to further racial
or economic discrimination.”291 Additionally, the Court noted that there is
“nothing in the record or in the court’s findings indicating that poor
Negroes were not allowed to register or vote, to choose the political party
they desired to support, to participate in its affairs or to be equally
represented on those occasions when legislative candidates were
chosen.”292 The Court explained that the black voters lost, not because they
were black but because they were aligned with a political party that lost
political power as a result of a legitimate political contest in which one

287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.

403 U.S. 124 (1971).
412 U.S. 755 (1973).
See Whitcomb, 403 U.S. at 127–29.
See id.
Id. at 149.
Id.
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party is expected to win and another is expected to lose.293 Put differently,
these plaintiffs were legitimate political process losers and not victims of
racial discrimination. Consequently, the Court was not interested in
offering them any relief.294
By contrast, in White v. Regester, the Court upheld a district court’s
findings that multimember districts in Texas violated the Equal Protection
Clause.295 The Court read Whitcomb to stand for the proposition that
plaintiffs challenging multimember districts on vote dilution grounds must
“produce evidence to support findings that the political processes leading to
nomination and election were not equally open to participation by the
group in question—that its members had less opportunity than did other
residents in the district to participate in the political processes and to elect
legislators of their choice.”296 The Court distinguished Whitcomb on the
ground that the lower court in White found evidence that voters of color
were generally excluded from the political process and suffered from a
history of racial discrimination.297 Because the plaintiffs in White were
successfully able to frame their claims in racial terms, they prevailed. This
is the race versus politics duality.
CONCLUSION
The story of Reynolds v. Sims is generally a story of population
equality. The case is widely considered a triumph of judicial intervention in
the face of severe democratic pathologies. We are happy to share in the
conventional wisdom. But we think that this is a limited view of the case
and the revolution it spawned. Reynolds is the most important case in the
Democracy canon. This is because after Reynolds, the Supreme Court set
itself on a confident and assertive path through the political process, taking
on any and all questions. More than fifty years later, we are still coming to
terms with the full implications of that decision.

293. Id. at 153 (“The failure of the ghetto to have legislative seats in proportion to its populations
emerges more as a function of losing elections than of built-in bias against poor Negroes. The voting
power of ghetto residents may have been ‘cancelled out’ as the District Court held, but this seems a
mere euphemism for political defeat at the polls.”).
294. Id. at 154–55 (“The mere fact that one interest group or another concerned with the outcome
of Marion County elections has found itself outvoted and without legislative seats of its own provides
no basis for invoking constitutional remedies where, as here, there is no indication that this segment of
the population is being denied access to the political system.”).
295. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, at 765–70 (1973).
296. Id. at 766.
297. See, e.g., id. at 768–69.

